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Abstract 
A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment 
errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, 
and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other 
categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by 
features, and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, 
quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based 
on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The 
quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these 
judgment errors including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. The 
quantum model introduces a new fundamental concept to cognition -- the compatibility versus 
incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. 
We conclude that quantum information processing principles provide a viable and promising 
new way to understand human judgment and reasoning.  
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  Over 30 years ago, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) began their influential program of 
research to discover the heuristics and biases that form the basis of human probability judgments. 
Since that time, a great deal of new and challenging empirical phenomena have been discovered 
including conjunction and disjunction fallacies, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference 
(Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). Although heuristic concepts (such as representativeness, 
availability, anchor-adjustment) initially served as a guide to researchers in this area, there is a 
growing need to move beyond these intuitions, and develop more coherent, comprehensive, and 
deductive theoretical explanations (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). The purpose of this article is to 
propose a new way of understanding human probability judgment using quantum probability 
principles (Gudder, 1988).   
     At first, it might seem odd to apply quantum theory to human judgments. Before we 
address this general issue, we point out that we are not claiming the brain to be a quantum 
computer; rather we only use quantum principles to derive cognitive models and leave the neural 
basis for later research.
 
That is, we use the mathematical principles of quantum probability 
detached from the physical meaning associated with quantum mechanics. This approach is 
similar to the application of complexity theory or stochastic processes to domains outside of 
physics.
 1
  
There are at least five reasons for doing so: (1) judgment is not a simple read out from a 
pre-existing or recorded state, instead it is constructed from the question and the cognitive state 
created by the current context; from this first point it then follows that (2) drawing a conclusion 
from one judgment changes the context which disturbs the state of the cognitive system; and the 
second point implies (3) changes in context and state produced by the first judgment affects the 
next judgment producing order effects, so that (4) human judgments do not obey the 
commutative rule of Boolean logic, and finally (5) these violations of the commutative rule lead 
to various types of judgment errors according to classic probability theory. If we replace `human 
                                                          
1
 There is another line of research that uses quantum physical models of the brain to understand consciousness 
(Hammeroff, 1998) and human memory (Pribram, 1993). We are not following this line, and instead we are using 
quantum models at a more abstract level analogous to Bayesian models of cognition. 
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judgment' with 'physical measurement' and replace `cognitive system' with `physical system', 
then these are the same points faced by physicists in the 1920's that forced them to develop 
quantum theory. In other words, quantum theory was initially invented to explain non-
commutative findings in physics that seemed paradoxical from a classical point of view. 
Similarly, non-commutative findings in cognitive psychology, such as order effects on human 
judgments, suggest that classical probability theory is too limited to fully explain all aspects of 
human cognition. So while it is true that quantum probability has rarely been applied outside of 
physics, a growing number of researchers are exploring its use to explain human cognition 
including perception (Atmanspacher, Filk, & Romer, 2004), conceptual structure (Aerts & 
Gabora, 2005), information retrieval (Van Rijsbergen, 2004), decision making (Franco, 2009; 
Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009), and other human judgments  (Khrennikov, 2010).
2
   
 Thus this article has two major goals. An immediate goal is to use quantum probability 
theory to explain some paradoxical findings on probability judgment errors. But a larger goal is 
to blaze a new trail that can guide future applications of quantum probability theory to other 
fields of judgment research.  The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First we 
develop a psychological interpretation of quantum probability theory and compare it side by side 
with classic probability theory.  Second we use the quantum model to derive qualitative 
predictions for conjunction errors and disjunction errors and other closely related findings.  Third 
we examine the quantitative predictions of the quantum model for a probabilistic inference task 
and compare these predictions to a heuristic anchor-adjustment model previously used to 
describe order effects. Fourth, we briefly summarize other applications of quantum theory to 
cognition. Finally we discuss the main new ideas it contributes and issues about rationality that it 
raises. 
I. Quantum Judgment Model. 
The same quantum judgment model is applied to two different types of probability 
judgment problems. Both types involve probability judgments about two or more events. The 
first type of problem is a single judgment about a combination of events such as the conjunction 
or disjunction of events. According to our quantum theory, judgments about event combinations 
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 Also see the special issue on quantum cognition (Bruza, Busemeyer, & Gabora, 2009). 
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require an implicit sequential evaluation of each component event. The second type of problem 
requires an explicit sequence of judgments about a hypothesis based on evaluation of a series of 
events. We argue that judgment errors arise in both tasks from the sequential evaluation of 
events, because conclusions from earlier judgments change the context for later judgments. 
 Quantum theory requires the introduction of a number of new concepts to cognitive 
psychologists. First we present these concepts in an intuitive manner that directly relates the 
ideas to psychological judgments. Later we summarize the basic axioms of quantum probability 
more formally and compare these side by side with classic probability used in Bayesian models.  
 To introduce the new ideas, let us consider the famous ‘Linda’ problem which has been 
used to demonstrate the conjunction fallacy.  (Many different types of stories have been used in 
past research to study conjunction effects, but this story is the most famous of all). Judges are 
provided a brief story about a woman named Linda, who used to be a philosophy student at a 
liberal university and who used to be active in an anti-nuclear movement. Then the judge is 
asked to rank the likelihood of the following events:  that Linda is now (a) active in the feminist 
movement, (b) a bank teller, and (c) active in the feminist movement and a bank teller, (d) active 
in the feminist movement and not a bank teller, (e) active in the feminist movement or a bank 
teller.  The conjunction fallacy occurs when option c is judged to be more likely than option b 
(even though the latter contains the former), and the disjunction fallacy occurs when option a is 
judged to be more likely than option e (again the latter contains the former). 
1. State representation. To apply quantum probability to this problem, our first postulate 
is that the Linda story generates a state of belief represented by a unit length state vector that can 
be described by a high dimensional vector space. Each dimension of the vector space 
corresponds to a basis vector. Formally, a basis for a vector space is a set of mutually orthogonal 
and unit length vectors that span the vector space.  That is, any point in the space can be reached 
from a linear combination of the basis vectors.  Psychologically, each basis vector represents a 
unique combination of properties or feature values, called a feature pattern, which is used to 
describe the situation under question.  The state vector is a working memory state (Baddeley, 
1992) that represents the judge’s beliefs about Linda regarding the feature patterns. On the one 
hand, our use of feature vectors to represent cognitive states follows other related cognitive 
research (e.g., memory, categorization) whereby information is represented as vectors in high-
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dimensional spaces.  On the other hand, our basis vectors and state vector are analogous to the 
elementary events and the probability function, respectively, used in classic probability theory. 
In general the feature space used to form the basis for describing the state is constructed 
from long term memory in response to both the story that is presented and the question that is 
being asked. To make this concrete, let us consider a very simple toy example. Initially focus on 
the Linda story and the question about whether or not Linda is a feminist, and suppose this 
question calls to mind three binary features which are used to describe the judge’s beliefs about 
Linda for this event: she may or may not be a feminist, she can be young or old, and she can be 
gay or straight.    Then the vector space would have eight dimensions, and one basis vector 
would correspond to the feature pattern (feminist, young, gay), a second would correspond to the 
feature pattern (not feminist, young, straight), a third would correspond to the feature pattern 
(feminist, old, straight), etc.  In classic probability theory, these eight feature patterns would 
represent the eight elementary events formed by the eight conjunctions of three binary events.  
In actuality, there may be many more features, and each feature may have many values, 
all generated by the story and the question. In particular, if there are n individual features (n = 3 
features in our example) that take on m different values (m = 2 in our example), then the 
dimension of the feature space is N = n
m
.  The problem of defining all the relevant features is not 
unique to quantum theory, and also arises in the specification of a sample space for a Bayesian 
model.  Experimentally, one could devise artificial worlds in which the features are carefully 
controlled by instruction or training. For problems involving real world knowledge, there is less 
control, and instead, one could ask judges to list all of the relevant features. For our toy example, 
we restrict our discussion to the above three binary features for simplicity. But our general theory 
does not require us to specify this a priori. In fact, one great advantage of the quantum model is 
that many qualitative predictions can be derived without imposing these additional assumptions. 
However, later on when we present a quantitative test of the quantum model, we fully specify the 
feature space and its dependence on the story and the question. 
To evaluate the question about feminism, the judge uses knowledge about the features 
based on the Linda story and other related past experience. The state vector represents the 
judge’s beliefs about Linda by assigning a belief value, called an amplitude, to each basis vector 
(feature pattern or combination of features), and the squared magnitudes of the amplitudes sum 
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to one. In general, amplitudes can be complex numbers, but they can always be transformed to 
square roots of probabilities prior to a judgment, and only the latter is used to represent a belief 
that is available for reporting (see Appendix A).  In our toy example, the amplitude assigned to 
the (feminist, young, gay) basis vector represents the judge’s belief about this feature pattern.  
Usually the belief state has some amplitude assigned to each basis vector, in other words the 
belief state is a linear combination of the basis vectors (called a superposition state). But a 
special case is one in which a belief state exactly equals a basis vector.  In this special case, the 
belief state has an amplitude with magnitude equal to one assigned to a single basis vector and 
zeros everywhere else. This corresponds to the special case in which a person is certain about the 
presence of a specific feature pattern.  In the section on qualitative tests, we derive predictions 
without assuming specific values for the amplitudes. However, the section on quantitative tests 
describes a specific way to assign these amplitudes 
2. Event Representation.  An event refers to a possible answer to a question about 
features chosen from a common basis. For example, the answer ‘yes’ to the feminism question is 
one event, and the answer ‘no’ to the feminism question is the complementary event.  Our 
second postulate is that each event is represented by a subspace of the vector space, and each 
subspace has a projector that is used to evaluate the event. 
Consider once again our toy example with eight basis vectors.  The event ‘yes’ to the 
specific question ‘is Linda is a feminist, young, gay person’ corresponds to the subspace spanned 
by the basis vector (feminist, young, gay), which is a single ray in the vector space.  To evaluate 
this event, the judge maps (more formally projects) the belief state vector down onto this ray. 
This is analogous to fitting the belief state to this basis vector (feminist, young, gay) using simple 
linear regression. This fitting process is performed by a cognitive operator called the projector 
that evaluates the fit of the feature pattern (feminist, young, gay). Thus the event ‘yes’ to the 
question ‘is Linda a feminist young gay person’ corresponds to a ray, and this ray has a projector 
which is used to evaluate its fit to the belief state. 
Now consider a more general event such as saying ‘yes’ to the question ‘is Linda a 
feminist.’ Note that the question about feminism concerns only one of the many possible features 
that are being considered. In our toy example, a yes answer to the feminism question is 
consistent with only four of the basis vectors: (yes feminist, young, gay), (yes feminist, young, 
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straight), (yes feminist, old, gay), (yes feminist, old, straight). The span of these four basis 
vectors forms a four dimensional subspace within the eight dimensional space, which represents 
the event ‘yes’ to the feminist question.  This is comparable to a union of these four elementary 
events in classic probability. To evaluate this event, the judge maps (more formally projects) the 
belief state down onto this four dimensional subspace. This is analogous to fitting the belief state 
to the four basis vectors using multiple regression. Once again, the cognitive operator that 
performs this mapping is called the projector for the ‘yes’ to the feminism question.  In the event 
of answering no to the feminism question, the complementary subspace is used, which is the 
subspace spanned by the remaining four basis vectors (not feminist, young, gay), (not feminist, 
young, straight), (not feminist, old, gay), (not feminist, old, straight).    
3. Projective Probability. Quantum theory provides a geometric way to compute 
probabilities. Our third postulate is that the judged probability of concluding yes to a question 
equals the squared length of the projection of the state vector onto the subspace representing the 
question. 
To make this clear, first let us consider the judged probability of concluding that a 
specific feature pattern, say (feminist, young, gay) from our toy example, is true of Linda. To 
evaluate this event, the judge projects the belief state vector down onto the ray representing 
(feminist, young, gay), and the result of this fit is called the projection. In our toy example, the 
projection has zeros assigned to all basis vectors except the (feminist, young, gay) basis vector, 
and the basis vector (feminist, young, gay) is assigned a value equal to its original amplitude. 
Finally the judged probability for yes to this elementary event equals the squared length of this 
projection (the squared magnitude of the amplitude, which is analogous to the squared 
correlation).  Psychologically speaking, the person evaluates how well each feature pattern fits 
the belief state, and the judged probability for that feature pattern equals the proportion of the 
belief state reproduced by the feature pattern.   
Now consider the judged probability of a more general event. The judge evaluates the 
event ‘yes’ to the feminism question by judging how well his or her beliefs about Linda are fit by 
the feminism feature patterns used to describe this event. The projection for the yes response to 
the feminism question is made by mapping (projecting) the belief state vector down onto the 
subspace representing the ‘yes to the feminism question.’  In our toy example, this projection is 
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obtained by setting to zero the amplitudes corresponding to (not feminist, young, gay), (not 
feminist, young, straight), (not feminist, old, gay), (not feminist, old, straight), and retaining only 
the remaining amplitudes previously assigned to (yes feminist, young, gay), (yes feminist, 
young, straight), (yes feminist, old, gay), (yes feminist, old, straight).  To continue with our 
example, the judged probability for ‘yes’ to the feminism question equals the square length of the 
projection onto the subspace corresponding to this event.  This is analogous to the R
2
 produced 
by fitting the person’s beliefs to the feminist basis vectors using multiple regression. In our toy 
example, the judged probability for saying yes to the feminism question equals the sum of the 
squared magnitudes of the amplitudes assigned to the four basis vectors (yes feminist, young, 
gay), (yes feminist, young, straight), (yes feminist, old, gay), (yes feminist, old, straight).  In 
classic probability, this is computed by summing the probabilities of elementary events that form 
the union. 
The residual difference (between the original state vector and the projection on the yes 
answer to feminism) equals the projection on the complementary subspace corresponding to a no 
answer on the feminism question.  Thus the projection on the yes answer is orthogonal (i.e. 
uncorrelated) to the projection on the no answer to the feminism question. The judged 
probability for concluding no to the feminism question is determined from the projection on the 
no subspace, so that the no probability equals one minus the probability of saying yes.  If the 
vector lies entirely in a subspace, then the squared projection of the vector onto the subspace will 
be 1, if the vector is perpendicular to the subspace, then the squared projection will be 0. Note 
that two subspaces are orthogonal if they correspond to mutually exclusive states of affairs.  
This scheme provides a precise way to express Tversky and Kahneman’s 
representativeness proposal in judgment. Tversky and Kahneman suggested that the conjunction 
fallacy arises because participants consider Linda to be a representative case of feminists. 
However, previously, representativeness has been interpreted as an intuition of how much the 
belief about Linda based on the story matched the prototype of feminists in the question. Now 
we can interpret representativeness as the projection or fit of a belief state vector about Linda to 
the subspace corresponding to knowledge about feminists. The squared length of the projection 
corresponds to the proportion of the belief state reproduced by the subspace. This generalization 
of the concept of representativeness makes a critical difference in its application. 
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4. State revision. Suppose the person concludes that an event is a true fact. Our fourth 
postulate is that the original state vector changes to a new conditional state vector, which is the 
projection onto the subspace representing the event that is concluded to be true, but now 
normalized to have unit length. This is called Lüder’s rule (Niestegge, 2008) and it is analogous 
to computing a conditional probability in classic theory.  Now we need to expand on what it 
means for a person to conclude that an event is true. 
First, suppose that the judge is simply informed that the answer to the feminism question 
is yes. Based on this information, the amplitudes corresponding to (not feminist, young, gay), 
(not feminist, young, straight), (not feminist, old, gay), (not feminist, old, straight) are set to zero, 
and the remaining amplitudes previously assigned to (yes feminist, young, gay), (yes feminist, 
young, straight), (yes feminist, old, gay), (yes feminist, old, straight) are now divided by the 
length of this projection. Thus the new conditional state vector has unit length so that the squared 
magnitudes of the new amplitudes assigned by the conditional state vector sum to one.  This 
corresponds to the normalization used to form conditional probabilities in classic probability 
theory. 
Second, consider an example related to an inference problem used in section III for the 
second application of quantum theory presented in this article. Suppose a juror is evaluating guilt 
or innocence, which depends on whether positive or negative evidence is present. Before the 
evidence the belief state has amplitudes assigned to four different patterns (guilty, positive), 
(guilty, negative), (not guilty, positive), (not guilty, negative). Now suppose the prosecutor 
presents positive evidence. Based on this information, the amplitudes corresponding to (guilty, 
negative) and (not guilty, negative) are set to zero, and the remaining amplitudes are now divided 
by the length of the resulting vector so that the squared magnitude of the amplitudes of the 
revised state sum to one. Again this is analogous to how conditional probabilities are revised by 
evidence according to Bayes’ rule. 
The conditional state vector is then used to answer subsequent questions. For example, if 
the person concludes that Linda is a feminist, then the state conditioned on this conclusion is 
used to judge the probability that she is also a bank teller. Following the earlier principles, the 
judged probability for yes to this next question is determined by projecting the conditional state 
vector onto the bank teller subspace and squaring this projection.  In other words, the judged 
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conditional probability for yes to the bank teller question, given that Linda is a feminist, equals 
the squared length of the projection of the conditional state (given yes to feminism) on the bank 
teller subspace. Alternatively, the judged probability that Linda is a bank teller, before making 
any conclusions about feminism, is simply determined by the original belief state that was 
initially generated by the Linda story. 
5. Compatibility. At this point, we have not yet defined the basis vectors used to describe 
the bank teller question. In our toy example, we started by considering the feminism question, 
which we assumed called to mind, in addition to the feminism feature,  other related features 
such as age, and sexual orientation (and other related features not included for simplicity). 
However, when answering this question, we didn’t rely on any features about bank tellers or 
other professional occupations. In other words, in considering the feminism question, we 
deliberately chose not to include these features, because we are assuming that the person never 
thought much about these unusual combinations of questions (feminism and bank teller) before. 
Thus, these have to be treated as two separate questions answered one at a time. The person may 
have thought about professions and their relations to salaries and other occupational features, but 
more likely than not, (s)he never thought enough about feminism and professions together to 
form precise beliefs about these particular combinations. Therefore, in order to answer the 
question about the profession of Linda, (s)he needs to view the problem from a different 
perspective and evaluate this question using knowledge about the combinations of a different set 
of features relating to professions. To continue with the toy example, suppose the person 
considers four professions (e.g., bank teller, doctor, insurance agent, computer programmer) 
along with two levels of salary (low, high) forming eight feature patterns (each combination of 
four professions and two salary levels), and the eight basis vectors corresponding to these feature 
patterns span an eight dimensional vector space.
3
 The key idea is that the set of feature patterns 
used to evaluate profession is inconsistent with the set used to think about feminism, in which 
case we say the two questions are incompatible, and they must be answered sequentially. 
In this toy example, only eight dimensions (e.g. four professions combined with two 
levels of salary) are used for simplicity. A more realistic model could use a much larger 
dimensional space. For example, suppose we use N = 100 dimensions to represent the space. 
                                                          
3
 It is possible that some features, say gender or college major, are compatible with both feminism and bank teller.  
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Then to answer the question about feminism, age could be represented by say 25 age levels 
(young versus old now represents only two coarse categories of these 25 age levels) combined 
with 2 levels of feminism and 2 levels of sexual orientation. To answer the question about 
professions, we could use say 10 professions combined with 10 salary levels (low versus high 
now represents two coarse categories of the 10 salary levels). By increasing the dimensionality 
of the space, we can allow for more refined levels of the features, which can then be categorized 
in various ways. 
The concept of incompatibility is formalized by using a vector space representation of 
knowledge -- the same vector space can be represented by many different sets of basis vectors 
(corresponding to different sets of feature patterns),  and the same exact state (vector) can be 
defined by different sets of basis vectors. Each (orthonormal) set of basis vectors corresponds to 
a description of the situation using a particular set of features and their combinations.  But 
different sets of basis vectors correspond to different descriptions, using different sets of features 
and combinations, representing complementary ways of thinking about events. Formally, we can 
apply a unitary operator to transform one set of basis vectors to another. This is analogous to 
rotating the axes in multidimensional scaling (Carrol & Chang, 1970; Shepard, 1962) or 
multivariate signal detection theory (Lu & Dosher, 2008; Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004). 
Psychologically this corresponds to considering different perspectives or different points of view 
for answering questions. For example, in the second application to inference, we argue that a 
juror has to view evidence from a prosecutor’s point of view and then view the evidence from a 
defense point of view, and it is not possible to hold these two incompatible views in mind at the 
same time. Later on when we present our quantitative test of the quantum model, we provide a 
detailed description of this rotation process.  However, qualitative tests of the quantum model 
can be derived without making these specific assumptions. So first we examine these qualitative 
properties of the theory, and later we examine a more specific model. 
The above ideas lead us to an important fifth postulate about compatibility. If two 
questions can be answered using a common basis (i.e. the same basis vectors corresponding to a 
common set of feature patterns), then the questions are said to be compatible. If two questions 
must be answered using a different basis (i.e. using different sets of basis vectors corresponding 
to a different set of feature patterns), then the two questions are said to be incompatible.  To 
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continue with our toy example, a question about age is compatible with a question about 
feminism, and a question about salary is compatible with a question about profession, but a 
question about feminism is incompatible with a question about profession. In order to make 
questions about feminism, age, and sexual orientation compatible with questions about 
profession and salary, a person would need to utilize a (222)(42) =64 dimensional space, with 
each basis vector representing one of the feature patterns produced by a unique combination of 
these 5 features. This is also the number of elementary events that would be required to represent 
the sample space in classic probability theory. Instead the person could utilize a lower 8 
dimensional space by representing questions about feminism, age, and sexual orientation in a 
way that is incompatible with questions about occupation and salary.  Thus compatibility 
requires using a higher dimensional space to form all combinations, whereas incompatibility can 
make use of a lower dimensional representation by changing perspectives.  Incompatibility 
provides an efficient and practical means for a cognitive system to deal with all sorts and 
varieties of questions. But a person must answer incompatible questions sequentially. 
Suppose the question about feminism is incompatible with the question about bank teller 
(e.g., the basis vectors are related by a rotation). Then the basis vectors used to represent the 
feminism question are not orthogonal to the basis vectors used to represent the bank teller 
question. For example, the inner product (analogous to correlation) between the (feminist, old, 
straight) basis vector and the (bank teller, low salary) basis vector could be positive. More 
generally, the subspace for feminism lies at oblique angles with respect to the subspace for bank 
teller. To see the implications of using incompatible events, consider again the feminist bank 
teller problem again. Initially, based on the details of the Linda story, it is very difficult to 
imagine Linda as a bank teller; but once the person concludes that Linda is a feminist, the state is 
projected on to the feminism subspace, which eliminates many specific details about Linda story. 
(Projecting onto the feminism subspace will retain only those elements of the original Linda 
story which are consistent with feminism). From this more abstract projection on the feminism 
subspace, the person can imagine all sorts of professions for feminists (e.g., some feminists that 
are bank tellers). Clearly, some professions remain more probable than others given the original 
story, but when thinking about the more general category of feminists, the person can entertain 
possibilities which were extremely unlikely for Linda herself. For example, if the projection of 
Linda on the feminism subspace produces a state corresponding to (old, straight, feminist), then 
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he or she may have some past experiences associating this type of feminist with low salary bank 
clerks. The associations do not have to be strong, but they make it easier to imagine Linda as a 
feminist and a feminist as a bank teller, even though it was initially (before the ‘feminist’ 
question) very difficult to imagine Linda as a bank teller. In this way, quantum probability also 
incorporates ideas related to the popular availability heuristic (Kahneman, et al., 1982). The 
answer to the first question can increase the availability of events related to a second question. 
Order effects. Incompatibility is a source of order effects on judgments, and it is critically 
here that quantum probabilities deviate from classic probabilities. To see how order effects can 
happen, consider the special simple case in which the judged probability of feminist given bank 
teller equals the judged probability of bank teller given feminist (a simple geometric example is 
shown in Appendix A). One order is to judge if Linda is a bank teller, and given that she is a 
bank teller, if she is also a feminist; this probability is obtained by the product of the probability 
that Linda is a bank teller and the conditional probability that she is a feminist given that she is a 
bank teller.  On the basis of the Linda story, the judged probability for yes to bank teller is close 
to zero, and when this is multiplied by the probability of feminist given bank teller, it is even 
closer to zero. The other order is to judge if Linda is a feminist, and given that she is a feminist, 
if she is also is a bank teller; this probability is obtained by the product of the probability that 
Linda is a feminist and the conditional probability that she is a bank teller given that she is a 
feminist.  On the basis of the Linda story, the judged probability that Linda is feminist is very 
high, and when this is multiplied by the same (as assumed) conditional probability of bank teller 
given feminist, then the product produced by the feminist – bank teller order must be greater than 
the product produced by the bank teller – feminist order.  This order effect cannot happen with 
classic probability theory (because these two orders produce the same joint probability), but 
Appendix A provides a very simple geometric and numerical example of this order effect using 
quantum theory.  In sum, the indirect path of thought from Linda to feminism to bank teller is a 
fair possibility even though the direct path from Linda to bank teller is almost impossible. In 
other words, asking first about feminism increases the availability of later thoughts about bank 
tellers.  
What is the evidence for order effects and is there any reason to think that quantum 
theory provides a good explanation for them?  It is well established that presentation order 
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affects human probability judgments (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). In section II on qualitative 
tests, we present evidence for question order effects on conjunction fallacies (Stolarz-Fantino, 
Fantino, Zizzo, & Wen, 2003), and we account for them with the quantum model. In section III 
on quantitative tests, we successfully fit the quantum model to the results of a new study 
examining order effects on inference (Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2010b). In section IV on other 
applications and extensions, we report some surprisingly accurate predictions of the quantum 
model for question order effects in attitude questionnaire research (Moore, 2002).   
Theoretical Postulates. Below we summarize the five quantum postulates (Von Neumann, 
1932) more formally, and we compare them to the corresponding postulates of classic probability 
(Kolmogorov, 1933).
4
 At a conceptual level, a key difference is that classic theory relies on a set 
theoretic representation whereas quantum theory uses a geometric representation. 
1. Classic theory begins with the concept of a sample space, which is a set that contains all 
the events. Suppose (for simplicity) the cardinality of this sample space is N so that the 
sample space is comprised of N elementary events or points. Classic theory defines the 
state of a system (e.g. all of a person’s beliefs) by a probability function p that assigns a 
probability (a real number between zero and one inclusive) to each elementary event, and 
the probabilities assigned by p sum to one.  If Ei is an elementary event, then p(Ei) is the 
probability assigned to this event. 
 
Quantum theory uses an N dimensional vector space to contain all the events. The vector 
space is described by a set of N (orthonormal) basis vectors, and each basis vector 
corresponds to an elementary event. Quantum theory defines the state of a system (e.g., a 
person’s belief state) by a state vector, denoted |, which assigns an amplitude to each 
basis vector, and the state vector has unit length. The amplitude assigned to a basis 
vector, such as the basis vector |Ei, equals the inner product between the basis vector and 
state vector, denoted Ei|. 
 
2. Classic theory defines a general event as a subset of the sample space.  The event A is 
defined by the union of the elementary events that it contains:  A = i A Ei. 
                                                          
4
 Both theories are applicable to the continuum but for simplicity we will limit this presentation to the finite case. 
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Quantum theory defines a general event as a subspace of the vector space, and each 
subspace corresponds to a projector.   
 
The projection of a state onto a ray spanned by basis vector |Ei equals Pi| =|EiEi|, 
where Ei| is an inner product.  The projector for this ray equals Pi =|EiEi|, which is an 
outer product.  The projector for event A spanned by a subset {|E1, …,|Ek} of 
orthonormal basis vectors  equals PA =  iA Pi .    
 
3. In classic theory, the probability of an event equals the sum of the probabilities assigned 
to the elementary events contained in the subset. If A is an event, then p(A) =  i  A p(Ei), 
where Ei is an elementary event.  
 
In quantum theory, the probability of event A equals the squared length of the projection 
of the state onto the corresponding subspace. If PA is the projector for subspace A, then 
PA| is the projection, and the probability of event A equals ||PA|||
2
 =   i  A |Ei||
2
. 
 
4. Suppose that event A is concluded to be a true. Given this fact, classic theory changes the 
original probability function p into a new conditional probability function pA by the 
classic rule pA(B) = p(AB)/p(A), This conditional probability is more commonly written 
as p(B|A).   
 
Quantum theory changes the original state | into a new conditional state |A  by what 
is known as Lüder’s rule:  |A = PA|/||PA|||.  The probability of event B given event 
A is known to be true equals ||PB|A||
2
 = ||PBPA|||
2
 / ||PA|||
2
.   
 
5. Classic probability assumes a single common sample space from which all events are 
defined. In other words, all events are compatible. Two events from the sample space can 
always be intersected to form a single event in the sample space. 
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According to quantum theory, the same exact state can be represented by more than one 
basis.  This allows for two kinds of events: compatible versus incompatible. If two events 
A and B can be described by a common basis, then they are compatible and the projectors 
commute (PBPA = PAPB). When two events are compatible, the two subspaces can be 
combined to form a single event represented by a single projector. If these two events 
cannot be described by a common basis, then they are incompatible and the projectors do 
not commute (PBPA ≠ PAPB).  Formally, the basis vectors used to describe event A are a 
unitary transformation of the basis vectors used to describe event B. If event A is 
incompatible with event B, then the pair of events cannot be represented by a single 
projector and they have to be evaluated sequentially. 
 
If all events are compatible, then quantum theory is equivalent to classic theory (See p. 
20 in Gudder, 1979).  Thus incompatibility is a key new idea that distinguishes quantum 
and classic theories. 
A short and simple tutorial of the quantum postulates appears in Appendix A. These same five 
quantum postulates are consistently used in both of applications presented in this article. 
Implications. From these postulates we can also derive new implications for both classic 
and quantum theory. First, classic theory defines the negated event , ~A, as the complement of 
the subset for A, and its probability equals p(~A) = 1 – p(A). Quantum theory defines the 
negation of an event as the subspace orthogonal to the event A, represented by the projector P~A 
= I –PA, where I is the identity operator (I| =| ). Then the probability of ~ A equals 
||P~A|||
2
 = 1 –||PA|||
2
.  
Classic theory defines the probability of the conjunction ‘A and B’ as the probability 
p(A)p(B|A) = p(AB); but because p(AB) = p(BA), this is also equal to p(BA) = p(B)p(A|B) 
which equals the probability of ‘B and A.’ Thus order does not matter, and it makes sense to 
consider this a conjunction of events ‘A and B’ without regard to order.  In quantum theory, order 
does matter and the events in question have to be evaluated as a sequence (Franco, 2009): Using 
Lüder’s rule, the probability of event A and then event B equals ||PA|||
2||PB|A||
2
 = ||PBPA|||
2
.  
If the questions are compatible, so that the projectors commute, then ||PBPA|||
2
 = ||PAPB|||
2
, 
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order does not matter, and the conjunction can be interpreted in the same way as in classic 
theory. But if the events are incompatible, then the projectors do not commute, and ||PBPA|||
2
 ≠ 
||PAPB|||
2
. In other words, asking a sequence of two incompatible questions corresponds to the 
person starting from their initial belief state, projecting onto the subspace corresponding to the 
answer to the first question, and then projecting the resulting state onto the subspace 
corresponding to the answer to the second question. Reversing the order of these projections can 
lead to different results. Psychologically, such order effects can be interpreted in the sense that 
the first statement changes a person’s viewpoint for evaluating the second statement. Given the 
prevalence of order effects on human probability judgments (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992), this is 
an important advantage for quantum theory. 
The classic probability for the disjunction of two events ‘A or B’ is the probability 
assigned to the union of the two subsets representing the two events, which equals  
p(AB) =  p(AB) + p(A ~B) + p(~AB)  = p(A) + p(~AB)  = 1  p(~A~B). 
The last form, 1  p(~A~B) , is commonly used because it extends most easily to disjunctions 
involving more than two events. It is clear that p(AB) = p(B A) so that the order does not 
matter for classic theory, and so it makes sense to define this as a disjunction of events ‘A or B.’ 
Quantum theory assigns a probability to the sequence ‘A or then B’ equal to   
||PBPA|||
2
 +||P~BPA|||
2
 +||PBP~A|||
2
 = ||PA|||
2
 +||PBP~A|||
2
 = 1 ||P~BP~A|||
2
. 
Again we use the form 1 ||P~BP~A|||
2
 because this extends most easily to disjunctions 
involving more than two events. This form also makes it is clear that order does matter for 
quantum theory when the events are incompatible. 
 The classic probability rule for inferring a hypothesis on the basis of new evidence is 
Bayes rule, which is essentially derived from the definition of a conditional probability. A 
quantum analogue of Bayes rule is obtained from postulate 4, which is known as Lüder’s rule.  
In the section on quantitative tests we provide a more detailed description of the quantum model 
applied to inference problems. 
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Clearly, the sequential order that questions are considered is a major aspect of the 
application of quantum probability to human judgments. Any application of quantum theory 
must specify this order.  In the section on quantitative tests we present an experiment in which 
we directly manipulate this order.  However, in other problems the order of processing is not 
controlled, and the individual is free to choose an order. Sometimes there is a causal order 
implied by the questions that are being asked. For example, when asked to judge the likelihood 
that ‘the cigarette tax will increase and a decrease in teenage smoking occurs’ is it natural to 
assume that the causal event ‘increase in cigarette tax’ is processed first. But for questions with 
no causal order, such as ‘feminist and bank teller’, we assume that individuals tend to consider 
the more likely of the two events first.  Note that a person can easily rank order the likelihood of 
individual events (feminism versus bank teller) before going through the more extensive process 
of  estimating the probability of a sequence of events (feminism and then bank teller conditioned 
on the answer to the question about feminism). There are several ways to justify the assumption 
that the more likely event is processed first. One is that the more likely event matches the story 
better and so these features are more quickly retrieved and available for consideration. A second 
reason is that individuals sometimes conform to a confirmation bias (Wason, 1960) and seek 
questions that are likely to be confirmed first. Finally, our assumption of considering the more 
likely event first is analogous to the assumption that most important cues are considered first in 
probability inferences (Gerd Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).  For more than two events, the 
same principle applies and the events are processed in rank order of likelihood. 
Summary of the Quantum Judgment Model. When given a story, the judge forms a belief 
state that is represented by a state vector in a possibly high dimensional (feature) vector space. 
An answer to a question about an event is represented by a subspace of this vector space. The 
judged probability of an answer to a question equals the squared projection of the belief state 
onto the subspace representing the question. Two questions are incompatible if the two 
subspaces require the use of different sets of basis vectors. If the events involved in conjunction 
and disjunction questions are incompatible, then they must be processed sequentially, and the 
more likely of the two questions is processed first. In the latter case, the conclusion from the first 
question changes the state, and affects the second question, producing order effects which in turn 
cause conjunction and disjunction errors.  Judgments about hypotheses are revised according to 
Lüder’s rule, which uses the normalized projection to update the state based on the observed 
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evidence. If the sequence of evidence involves incompatible events, then the inference judgments 
exhibit order effects. 
Now we are prepared to apply the quantum judgment model to conjunction and 
disjunction errors and related phenomena. Later we present a quantitative test for order effects on 
inference.  The qualitative tests are important because they do not require making specific 
assumptions regarding the dimension of the feature space, or the amplitudes assigned to the 
initial state, or the relations between the incompatible features.  The quantitative test is important 
to describe how to make these specifications as well as to examine the capability of the model to 
make precise predictions in comparison with previous models.   
II. Qualitative predictions for conjunction and disjunction questions 
Conjunction and Disjunction Fallacies. There is now a large empirical literature 
establishing the findings of both conjunction fallacies (Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; 
Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002; Stolarz-Fantino, et al., 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983; Wedell & Moro, 2008) and disjunction fallacies (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1993; Carlson & 
Yates, 1989; Fisk, 2002). These findings are very robust and occur with various types of stories 
(e.g., female philosophy students who are now feminist bank tellers, high pressure business men 
who are over 50 and have heart disease, Norwegian students with blue eyes and blond hair, state 
legislatures that increase cigarette taxes and reducing teenage smoking), and various types of 
response measures (e.g., choice, ranking, probability ratings, monetary bids) (Sides, et al., 2002; 
Wedell & Moro, 2008). These fallacies are not simply the result of misunderstanding the 
meaning of probability, because they even occur with bets in which the word ‘probability’ never 
appears. For example, Sides et al. (2002) found that participants preferred to bet on the future 
event ‘cigarette tax will increase and teenage smoking will decrease’ over betting on the single 
event ‘teenage smoking will decrease.’ 
Moreover, both fallacies have been observed to occur at the same time (Morier & 
Borgida, 1984). For example, Morier and Borgida (1984) used the Linda story and found that the 
mean probability judgments were ordered as follows (where J(A) denotes the mean judgment for 
event A):  J(feminist) =.83 > J(feminist or bank teller) = .60 > J(feminist and bank teller) = .36 > 
J(bank teller) = .26 (N = 64 observations per mean, and all pair wise differences are statistically 
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significant).  These results violate classic probability theory which is the reason why they are 
called fallacies. 
The quantum model starts with a state vector | that represents the belief state after 
reading the Linda story; the event ‘yes to the feminist question’ is represented by a subspace 
corresponding to the projector PF;  the event ‘yes to the bank teller question’ is represented by an 
incompatible subspace corresponding to the projector  PB; and finally, the event ‘no to the 
feminist question’ is represented by an orthogonal subspace corresponding to the P~F so that  
PF+P~F = I. Our key assumption is that the projector PF does not commute with the projector PB 
(Franco, 2009). When considering a conjunction, the more likely event is considered first, and 
because ‘yes to feminist’ is more likely than ‘yes to bank teller’, the judged probability of the 
event ‘feminist and bank teller’ equals ||PF|||
2||PB|F||
2
 = ||PBPF|||
2
. 
For the conjunction fallacy, we need to compare the probability for the single event 
||PB|||
2
 with the probability for the conjunction ||PBPF|||
2
, and a conjunction fallacy is 
predicted when ||PBPF|||
2
 > ||PB|||
2
.  To do this comparison, we decompose the quantum 
probability of the bank teller event by expanding this event as follows:   
||PB|||
2
 = ||PBI|||
2
 = ||PB(PF + P~F)|||
2
 = ||PBPF| + PBP~F|||
2
  
   = ||PBPF|||
2
 + ||PBP~F|||
2
 + B,~F|B,F + B,F|B,~F,    (1) 
where |B,F  = PBPF| and|B,~F  = PBP~F|. The last term on the right hand side of Equation 
1, denoted  B = B,~F|B,F + B,F|B,~F, is called the interference term for the bank teller 
event.
5
  There is another interference, ~B, corresponding to the probability ||P~B|||
2
, but the two 
interferences must sum to zero so that (B + ~B) = 0 (see Appendix B). Thus one of these 
interference terms must be negative, and we argue that B < 0, because this makes it less likely to 
judge that Linda is a bank teller. Also the story suggests that the probability ||PBP~F|||
2
 of Linda 
‘not to be a feminist and to be a bank teller’ is small. Under these conditions, the interference can 
be sufficiently negative so that B  < ||PBP~F|||
2
, and consequently (||PBP~F| ||
2
 + B) < 0, 
                                                          
5
 The interference equals an inner product plus its conjugate, and so it is a real number. Cross product interference 
terms also arise in other applications of decision theory (Luce, Ng, Marley, & Aczel, 2008). 
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which implies ||PBPF|||
2
 > ||PB|||
2
 = ||PB PF|||
2
 | (||PBP~F|||
2
 + B) | as required to explain 
the conjunction fallacy. 
The interference, B, is determined by the inner product of two projections: One is the 
projection, |B,F, of the initial state first on the ‘she is a feminist’ subspace and then onto ‘she is 
a bank teller’ subspace; the second is the projection,|B,~F, of the initial state first onto ‘she is 
not a feminist’ subspace and then on to ‘she is a bank teller’ subspace.  Recall that the inner 
product is analogous to the correlation between two vectors. For many judges, the features 
matching ‘feminist bank teller’ may be negatively correlated (pointing in a dissimilar direction) 
with the features matching ‘not feminist bank teller’, thus producing negative interference.  
 Next consider the disjunction probability, in which the person judges the probability of 
saying no to ‘Linda is neither a bank teller nor a feminist.’ First note that when processing the 
two events ‘Linda is not a bank teller’ versus ‘Linda is not a feminist’ the former is more likely 
than the latter, and so the former is processed first. In this case, we need to compare the single 
event ||PF|||
2
 = 1 ||P~F|||
2
 with the probability for the disjunction 1||P~F P~B|||
2
, and 
disjunction fallacy is predicted when ||PF|||
2
 = 1||P~F|||
2
 > 1||P~FP~B|||
2
, or equivalently 
when ||P~FP~B|||
2
 > ||P~F|||
2
.  To do this, we mathematically decompose the quantum 
probability that Linda is not a feminist as follows:  
   ||P~F|||
2
 = ||P~FP~B|||
2
 + ||P~FPB|||
2
 + ~F, B|~F,~B + ~F,~B|~F,B.   (2) 
In this case, the interference is ~F = ~F,B|~F,~B + ~F,~B|~F,B.  Once again there is a 
corresponding interference F for ||PF|||
2
, and these two interferences must sum to zero (F 
+~F ) = 0 (see Appendix B). Thus one of these two interference terms must be negative, and we 
argue that F > 0, because this makes it more likely that Linda is a feminist. If the interference 
for ~F is sufficiently negative so that (|P~FPB||
2
 +
 ~F ) < 0,  then ||P~FP~B|||
2
  > ||P~F|||
2
 = 
||P~FP~B|||
2
  | (||P~FPB|||
2
 +
 ~F ) | as required to explain the disjunction fallacy.  
The interference, ~F, is determined by the inner product of two projections: One is the 
projection, |~F, ~B, of the initial state first on the ‘she is a not a bank teller’ subspace and then 
onto ‘she is a not a feminist’ subspace; the second is the projection,|~F, B, of the initial state 
first onto ‘she is a bank teller’ subspace and then on to ‘she is not a feminist’ subspace.  For 
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many judges, the features matching ‘not a bank teller and not a feminist’ may be negatively 
correlated (pointing in a dissimilar direction) with the features matching ‘bank teller and not a 
feminist’, thus producing negative interference.  
To complete the analysis of conjunction and disjunction fallacies, we must check to see 
what the quantum model predicts for the remaining ordinal relations reported by Morier and 
Borgida (1984). The quantity ||PB|F||
2
 is a probability so that 1 ≥||PB|F||
2
 ≥ 0, and it 
mathematically follows that  
||PF|||
2
 1 ≥||PF|||
2||PB|F||
2 
=||PBPF|||
2
.      (3) 
Therefore, the quantum model must predict that the event ‘Linda is a feminist’ is judged at least 
as likely as the conjunction.   
Now consider the order of the conjunction versus disjunction. The Linda story is 
designed so that the probability ||P~B PF|||
2
 corresponding to the ‘Linda is a feminist and she is 
not a bank teller’ conjunction is more likely than the probability ||P~FP~B|||
2
 corresponding to 
‘Linda is not a bank teller and she is not a feminist’ conjunction.6  This design implies that  
||P~FP~B|||
2
 < ||P~B PF|||
2
 +||P~F|||
2
 , 
but it is also true that  
||P~B PF|||
2
 +||P~F|||
2
 = 1 ||PBPF|||
2
   
 ||PBPF|||
2
 < 1 ||P~FP~B|||
2
,        (4) 
and Equation 4 implies that the conjunction is less likely than the disjunction. This last prediction 
is important because, even though human judgments tend to satisfy this constraint, there is no 
requirement for them to do so. Therefore, if both the conjunction and disjunction fallacies occur, 
then the quantum model must produce the order reported by Morier and Borgida (1984).  This is 
not true of theoretical explanations that we present later, which are free to produce consistent or 
inconsistent orderings of disjunction and conjunction events depending on free parameters.   
                                                          
6
 In fact, the empirical results are that ||P~BPF|||
2
 = .47 > ||P~F~B|||
2
 = .40. 
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Now the quantum model is forced to make another strong qualitative prediction.  Both 
conjunction and disjunction effects require the events to be incompatible; for if the events are 
compatible, then there is no interference (see Appendix B).  But incompatible events produce 
order effects. To simultaneously explain both the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, the 
model requires the following order constraint (see Appendix B):  ||PFPB|||
2
 < ||PBPF|||
2
.  This 
constraint exactly fits our psychological explanation of order effects that we presented earlier -- 
the first likely event increases availability of the second unlikely event.  In other words, 
processing the likely event first facilitates retrieving relevant thoughts for the second event, 
which then increases the likelihood of the conjunction. By contrast, if the unlikely event is 
processed first, it is hard to imagine any thoughts at all in favor of this unlikely event from the 
very beginning, which lowers the probability of the conjunction. 
Order Effects.  The quantum explanation for conjunction and disjunction errors must 
predict that order of processing is a critical factor for determining whether or not the fallacy will 
occur. One effective way to manipulate this order is to ask people to judge the conjunction first 
or last when judging the likelihood of events.  For example, after hearing a story, a person could 
be asked to judge the unlikely event U first, and then judge the conjunction ‘U and L’; or they 
could be asked these questions in the opposite order.  The quantum model predicts smaller 
effects when the conjunction is presented last, because in this case, the person evaluates the 
probability, ||PU|||
2
, for the unlikely event first, and so is encouraged to use this probability 
estimate to determine the conjunction probability for ‘U and L’. But in the latter case we must 
predict that ||PU|||
2||PL|U||
2
 = ||PLPU|||
2
, and mathematically it follows that ||PU|||
21 ≥ 
||PU|||
2||PL|U||
2
; therefore no conjunction error can occur. This reduction does not happen in 
the reverse order when the conjunction is evaluated first, because in this case, the `start with the 
higher probability event first' rule applies and the conjunction is always computed from the 
opposite order ||PL|||
2||PU|L||
2
 =||PUPL|||
2
, which produces conjunction errors as given by 
Equation 1.  
In fact, conjunction errors are significantly larger when the conjunction is rated first as 
opposed to being rated last (Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; Stolarz-Fantino, et al., 2003). 
In the study by Stolarz-Fantino et al. (2003), when the single judgment for the unlikely event was 
made first, the mean judgment for the unlikely event was J(U) = .14 compared to J(U and L) = 
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.17 for the conjunction (N = 105, not significantly different); but when the conjunction was rated 
first, the mean judgment for the conjunction was J(U and L) = .26 compared to J(U) = .18 for the 
unlikely event (N = 102, significantly different). Similar robust and large effects of order were 
reported by Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991). This order effect also explains why ratings 
produce fewer errors than rank orders (Wedell & Moro, 2008) -- the latter procedure does not 
require any estimates of the constituent events ahead of time. 
 Averaging Type Errors.  One of the earliest explanations for conjunction and disjunction 
fallacies is that these judgments are based on the average of the likelihoods of the individual 
events (Abelson, Leddo, & Gross, 1987; Fantino, Kulik, & Stolarz-Fantino, 1997; Nilsson, 2008; 
Wyer, 1976). For example, if one averages the likely event L with an unlikely event U, then the 
average must lie in between these two likelihoods. If one assumes that more weight is placed on 
the unlikely event for the conjunctive question, and that more weight is placed on the likely 
event for the disjunction question, then this model can accommodate both fallacies at the same 
time.  
An important source of support for the averaging model is another fallacy called the 
averaging error (Fantino, et al., 1997). This finding involves a story followed by questions that 
are unlikely (U), moderately likely (M), and very likely (L) to be true based on the story. These 
questions produce the following reversal in the order for the mean judgments: J(U) < J(U and M) 
but J(M and L) < J(L), which again violates classic probability theory.  
This finding also rules out an additive model which assumes that judgments are made by 
adding (rather than averaging) the signed evidence of individual events (Yates & Carlson, 1986).  
According to an additive model, if J(M and L) < J(L) then signed evidence for M is negative, but 
if this is true then we should also observe J(U) > J(U and M), but the opposite occurs. 
For these unlikely (U), moderately likely (M), and very likely (L) type of questions, the 
quantum model must always predict the order ||PL|||
2
 >||PL|||
2||PU|L||
2 
=||PUPL|||
2
, which 
satisfies the second inequality that forms the averaging error. The first inequality in the 
averaging error is simply a conjunction fallacy, ||PUPM|||
2
 > ||PU|||
2
, which we have already 
explained using negative interference (see Equation 1). Thus the quantum model also explains 
this averaging error.  
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Event Likelihoods. In general, the interference term, , will depend on both the story and 
the question.  For the Linda story, the event ‘Linda is a feminist’ was designed to seem likely 
(producing a large projection for the likely event L, denoted ||PL|||
2
) whereas the event ‘Linda 
is a bank teller’ was designed to be unlikely (producing a small projection for the unlikely event 
U, denoted ||PU|||
2
). From Equation 3, it follows that the size of the conjunction error is 
bounded by  
||PL|||
2
 ≥ ||PUPL|||
2
 ≥ ||PU|||
2
 ,       (5) 
and it shrinks to zero if ||PL|||
2
 = ||PU|||
2
.  In fact, researchers find that both fallacies depend 
on the difference between the likelihoods of the two events (Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 
1991; Wells, 1985; Yates & Carlson, 1986). For example, the mean estimates reported by 
Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991) were J(A)=.28, J(B)=.19, J(A and B)=.18 when both 
events (A,B) were unlikely; J(A)=.77, J(B)=.23, J(A and B)=.38 when event A was unlikely and 
event B was likely; and J(A)=.76, J(B)=.69, J(A and B)=.67 when both events (A,B) were likely.  
The mean estimates reported by Fisk (2002) were J(A)=.36, J(B)=.14, J(A or B)=.27 when both 
events (A,B) were unlikely; J(A)=.23, J(B)=.73, J(A or B)=.59 when event A was unlikely and 
event B was likely; and J(A)=.80, J(B)=.62, J(A or B)=.75 when  both events (A,B) were likely.  
The constraint on the judgments imposed by Equation 5 implies another strong prediction 
of the quantum model. Only a single conjunction error can occur – that is when the conjunction 
is judged more likely than the lower likelihood event. When examining the mean or median of 
probability estimates, this prediction is generally supported (Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 
1991).  Furthermore, it is also generally found that single conjunction errors are overwhelmingly 
most frequent (Yates & Carlson, 1986). Double conjunction errors are infrequent, but they 
occasionally occur with two highly likely events, and the latter could be easily caused by 
judgments errors when all the events are rated almost equally high (Costello, 2009). 
An averaging model also predicts that conjunction and disjunction errors are larger for 
the (unlikely, likely) combination of events and that only single conjunction errors can occur. 
But the quantum and averaging models make distinct predictions for the extreme case of 
complementary events A and not A.  For complementary events, the quantum model must predict 
that the probability of the conjunction is zero (||P~APA|||
2
 = 0) and the probability of the 
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disjunction is one (1 ||P~APA|||
2
  = 1  0). Thus the quantum model must predict no 
conjunction or disjunction errors for this extreme case, except those produced accidently by 
random error (Costello, 2009). However, an averaging model must predict that these effects 
remain as large as ever for this extreme condition because the average must always fall between 
the likelihood of A and the likelihood of not A. For example if A is highly likely to be true, then 
~A is highly likely to be false, and the averaging model predicts that the conjunction will fall in 
between these two mutually exclusive events. In fact, conjunction and disjunction errors are 
greatly reduced when the events are mutually exclusive (Wolfe & Reyna, 2009). 
 Event Dependencies.   The quantum model makes another strong prediction concerning 
the effect of dependencies between events on the conjunction fallacy.  In classic theory, if pL(U) 
> P(U) so that knowledge of event L increases the probability of event U, then there is a positive 
dependency of event L on event U. According to the quantum model, an event L has a positive 
dependency on an event U if ||PU|L||
2
 > ||PU|||
2
. To produce a conjunction fallacy, the 
quantum model requires  
||PUPL|||
2
 = ||PL|||
2||PU|L||
2
 ≥ ||PU|||
2
       (6) 
 ||PU|L||
2
 ≥ ||PU|||
2
/||PL|||
2
 > ||PU|||
2
.  
Thus the quantum model is forced to predict that conjunction errors occur only when there is a 
positive dependency of the unlikely event on the likely event. For example, according to the 
quantum model, knowing that Linda is a feminist increases the likelihood that she is a bank 
teller. In fact, the presence of dependencies between events A and B has been shown to affect the 
rate of conjunction fallacies -- a positive conditional dependency generally increases the 
frequency of conjunction errors (Fisk, 2002).    
  Both classic and quantum theories predict that dependencies between events strongly 
influence the probability judgment for a sequence of events.  This property is important because 
the averaging model, which simply averages the likelihoods of the individual events, fails to 
consider event dependencies.  Not surprisingly, human judgments are strongly influenced by 
event dependencies, as cleverly shown by Miyamoto, Gonzalez, and Tu (1995). In their design, 
judges evaluated four conjunctions of events including ‘A and X’, ‘A and Y’, ‘B and X’, ‘B and 
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Y’.  Contrary to an averaging model, violations of independence were observed: J(A and X) > J(B 
and X) but J(A and Y) < J(B and Y). According to the averaging model, the common event (X) in 
the first comparison cancels out and so the first inequality implies that event A is more likely 
than event B; similarly, the common event (Y) in the second comparison cancels out and so the 
order established by the first comparison should be maintained for the second comparison (but it 
is not).  According to both the classic and quantum models, the probability of event A 
conditioned on the state X is larger than B, but the opposite occurs conditioned on the state Y.   
  Event Relationships.  One of the major criticisms of the representativeness heuristic 
concerns the effect of manipulating the relatedness between the two events.  Suppose two stories 
are told, one about the liberal college student named Linda, and another about an intellectual but 
somewhat boring man named Bill. After hearing both stories, the judge could be asked two 
related questions concerning the same person such as ‘is Linda a feminist and is Linda a bank 
teller’, or alternatively the judge could be asked two unrelated questions such as ‘is Linda a 
feminist and does Bill play jazz for a hobby.’  It turns out that the conjunction fallacy is almost 
equally strong for related and unrelated questions(Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; Yates & 
Carlson, 1986). This finding has been interpreted as evidence against the representativeness 
heuristic and evidence for a simple averaging rule. But this is not a problem for the quantum 
interpretation of the representativeness heuristic.  
 The quantum model predicts that conjunction errors only occur when there is 
interference, and interference can only occur when the two projectors do not commute. Thus the 
key question is whether or not the projectors commute, that is, whether or not the subspaces are 
based on a compatible set of basis vectors representing a common set of features. 
 Having already considered the case of related questions, let us now consider the case of 
unrelated questions (e.g. is Linda a feminist and does Bill play jazz for a hobby?). According to 
the quantum model, the knowledge obtained from the two stories is represented by a state vector 
| that now must contain knowledge about features of both Linda and Bill.  The projector PLF 
represents the question ‘is Linda a feminist’ and another projector PBJ represents the question 
‘does Bill play jazz for a hobby.’ The key question is whether or not these two projectors 
commute. Given that the judge never heard of these two people before, and given that the judge 
is unlikely to know anything about the co-occurrences of women who are feminists and men who 
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are jazz players, the judge cannot form a compatible representation that combines all these 
features in a consistent representation. Instead, the judge must fall back on a simpler 
incompatible representation that uses one set of features to evaluate the Linda question, and a 
different set of features to evaluate the Bill question. Thus we expect these two projectors to be 
non-commutative. This is exactly the property required to produce the conjunction error.   
Given that that the projectors for the two unrelated questions are incompatible, then the 
probability for the conjunction is obtained by first projecting the belief state on the ‘Linda is a 
feminist’ subspace followed by the projection on the ‘Bill plays jazz for a hobby’ subspace. The 
interference effect produced by this incompatible representation depends on the particular stories 
and questions. In this particular example, negative interference implies that thoughts evoked by 
thinking about a woman who is not a feminist are negatively correlated with thoughts about a 
man who plays jazz for a hobby. 
Further support for the idea that the unrelated questions are answered by incompatible 
subspaces comes from the finding of order effects found in the same studies by Gavansky and 
Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991). Conjunction errors were found to be more frequent and significantly 
larger when the conjunction question (e.g. Linda is a feminist and Bill plays jazz for a hobby) 
was presented first as opposed to being presented last.  
 Unpacking Effects.  A finding that is closely related to the disjunction error is the implicit 
unpacking effect (Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Sloman, Rottenstreich, Wisniewski, 
Hadjichristidis, & Fox, 2004)
7
. In this case, a person is asked to rank order the likelihood of the 
same logical event when it is described in the ‘packed’ form B versus in the ‘unpacked’ form (B 
and A or B and ~A). When an event (e.g., death by murder) is unpacked into a likely cause 
(murder by a stranger) and an unlikely cause (murder by an acquaintance) then the unpacked 
event is judged to be more likely than the packed event, which is called subadditivity 
(Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997). But if an event (e.g. death by disease) is unpacked into an 
unlikely cause and a residual (death from pneumonia or other diseases), then the packed event is 
judged to be more likely than the unpacked event (Sloman, et al., 2004).  Support theory 
                                                          
7
 The unpacking effect refers to a comparison between the sum of judgments of individual events versus the 
judgment of the union of these events. However, these findings are affected by the response scale used to make 
judgments, as well as judgment errors produced by judging individual events. We focus on the implicit unpacking 
effect which simply asks a person to order the likelihood of two events. 
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(Tversky & Koehler, 1994) was designed to explain the first (subadditivity), but it cannot explain 
the second (superadditivity). 
This effect is especially interesting because it provides an example where both positive 
and negative interference is required to explain the opposing results.  According to the quantum 
model, the probability for the unpacked event B can be decomposed as follows  
||PB|||
2
 = ||PB (PA +P~A)|||
2
 = ||PBPA|||
2
 +||PBP~A|||
2
 + ,    (7) 
where  is the interference term.8 The probabilities for the two unpacked events sum to  
 ||PBPA|||
2
 +||PBP~A|||
2
. 
In general the interference, , can be positive or negative, depending on the inner product 
between the projection PBPA|  and PBP~A|.  In all of the previous examples, we assumed that 
this inner product was negative, producing negative interference, resulting in a conjunction and 
disjunction effect.  To account for subadditivity we again need the interference to be negative, 
but to account for the opposite superadditive effect, the interference must become positive. The 
quantum model agrees with the intuition provided by Sloman et al. (2004) that when unpacking 
an event into an unlikely event and a residual, the indirect retrieval paths produced by unpacking 
make it difficult to reach the conclusion, and now it is easier to reach the conclusion directly 
from the packed event. The positive interference implies that the projection of the initial state 
first onto pneumonia and then on to death is positively correlated (pointing in a similar direction) 
with the projection of the initial state first on to the residual (diabetes, cirrhosis, etc.) and then 
onto death.  
Conditional versus Conjunction Probabilities.  Both classic and quantum probability 
models make a strong prediction concerning the comparison of the probability of a conjunction 
with the conditional probability involving the same events.  According to classic probability 
theory, pL (U) ≥ p(L)pL(U) = p(LU) and similarly the quantum model must obey  
||PU|L||
2 ≥ ||PL|||
2||PU|L||
2 
= ||PUPL|||
2
.       (8) 
                                                          
8
 Bordely (1998) first pointed out that quantum theory provides an alternative explanation for unpacking effects. 
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A conditional fallacy occurs when the probability of a conjunction strictly exceeds the 
conditional probability. 
The evidence regarding this fallacy is mixed. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) reported a 
study involving an unlikely (U) event ‘die from heart attack’ and a likely (L) causal event ‘age 
over 50.’ The mean judgment for the conditional probability equaled J(U given L) = .59; the 
mean judgment for the conjunction probability equaled J(U and L) = .30 ; and the mean 
judgment for the unlikely event equaled J(U) = .18. Thus the conditional event exceeded the 
conjunction event, but the conjunction exceeded the single event.  Hertwig, Bjorn, and Krauss 
(2008) found no differences between the conditional and conjunction probabilities, and used this 
to argue that people confuse or misinterpret these two types of questions.  Miyamoto, Lundell, 
and Tu (1988) investigated the conditional fallacy using four different stories. In one of the 
stories, the conditional exceeded the conjunction, in another the conditional equaled the 
conjunction, and in two other stories the conjunction exceeded the conditional. The largest 
fallacy occurred with a story based on rain and temperature in Seattle, which produced the results 
(N = 150): J(L)=.71 > J( L and U) =.61 >J(U) =.49 > J(U given L) = .47 (the difference between 
the means for the conjunction and the conditional was statistically significant). However, there 
was little difference between the conditional probability J(U given L) and the single event 
probability J(U), and so it is possible that the participants ignored the conditioning event L when 
judging the conditional ‘U given L.’ More research is needed on this important question. 
Conjunction of Three Events.  The quantum model also makes clear predictions for 
conjunctions involving two and three constituent events.  According to the quantum model, the 
judgment for the conjunction of unlikely (U), medium (M), and likely (L) events must be lower 
than the conjunction for a medium (M) and likely (L) event. This follows from the fact that 
||PL|||
2
  ||PM|L||
2
 ≥ ||PL|||
2
  ||PM|L||
2
  ||PU|M,L||
2
.   (9a) 
The quantum model predicts a higher judgment for a conjunction of an unlikely (U), likely (L1), 
and another likely (L2) event as compared to an unlikely (U) and likely (L2) event  under the 
following condition (for simplicity, suppose L2 is more likely than L1): 
     ||PL2|||
2
  ||PU|L2||
2
    ||PL2|||
2
   ||PUPL1|L2||
2
    ||PU|L2||
2
   ||PUPL1|L2||
2
.  
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Expanding the left hand term (as we did in Equation 1) produces the expression  
  ||PU |L2||
2
   = ||PU (PL1 +P~L1)|L2||
2
  = ||PUPL1|L2||
2
  + ||PUP~L1|L2||
2
  + .  (9b) 
It follows that the required inequality, ||PU|L2||
2
   ||PUPL1|L2||
2
, will hold if the interference is 
sufficiently negative so that  < ||PUP~L1|L2 ||
2
.  In this case, the judgment for a conjunction of 
three events is judged more likely than a conjunction of two events. 
 In fact, both of these predicted results have been experimentally obtained.  Judgments for 
the conjunction of an unlikely, moderate, and likely event were found to be lower than 
judgments for the conjunction of the same moderate and likely event (Stolarz-Fantino, et al., 
2003; Winman, Nilsson, Juslin, & Hansson, 2010). Furthermore, judgments for an unlikely, 
likely, and second likely event were found to be higher than judgments for the conjunction of the 
same unlikely and likely event (Winman, et al., 2010). Previously, these results were explained 
by an averaging model, but they are also consistent with the quantum model. 
Comparison of Explanations. The classic (Kolmogorov) probability model fails to 
explain conjunction and disjunction fallacies because, when given a story S and two uncertain 
events U and L, it requires p(UL| S)  p(U|S) and p(UL| S)  p(L| S ).  However, it is possible 
that people evaluate the conditional in the wrong direction (G. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). 
Classic probability theory does allow p(S|UL) > p(S|U) and p(S|UL) < p(S|L).  This 
explanation fails to predict any ordering for p(S|UL) versus p(S|L), nor does it predict any 
ordering for p(S|U L) versus p(S|UL).  A more serious problem is that this idea cannot 
explain why the fallacy occurs for a conjunction of future events that entail the current state. For 
example, given the current cigarette tax and teenage smoking rate, people prefer to bet on the 
event that ‘an increase in cigarette tax from the current rate and a decrease in teenage smoking 
from the current rate’ rather than the event ‘a decrease in teenage smoking from the current rate’ 
(Sides, et al., 2002). In this case, if we let S represent the current state of the world, then we are 
asked to compare p(SUL|S) = p(UL|S) versus p(SU|S) = p(U|S). If the conditional is 
reversed, then we have p(S|SUL) = p(S) = p(S|SU) which fails to explain the findings. 
Support theory (Tversky & Kohler, 1994) proposes that unpacking an event into its 
component parts increases the availability of the components, and thus the unpacked event is 
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judged to be more likely than the logically identical packed event. This theory provides an 
account of unpacking effects when they are subadditive, but not when they are superadditive. 
Tversky and Kohler (1994) also mentioned that support theory can explain conjunction errors as 
an effect of unpacking an unlikely event (e.g., bank teller). However, support theory fails to 
explain disjunction errors, because a packed event (such as feminism) is judged greater than the 
union of this same event with another separate event.  
 The most popular models for both conjunction and disjunction fallacies are the averaging 
model (Wyer, 1976) and adding (Yates & Carlson, 1986) models. These models seem especially 
plausible when conjunction errors are obtained without presenting any story, and judges are 
simply given numerical likelihoods on which to base their judgments (Gavanski & Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 1991).  In the latter case, it is hard to see how one could use a representativeness type 
heuristic that relies on feature descriptions when there are no features to use. The averaging 
model assumes that each item is assigned a likelihood value (zero to one), and the judgment for a 
conjunction or disjunction question equals the weighted average of these likelihoods. The adding 
model assumes each item is assigned a signed value of evidence (negative one to positive one), 
and the judgment for a conjunction or disjunction question equals the weighted sum of evidence. 
Different weights must be assigned to the unlikely and likely events to explain both the 
conjunction and disjunction errors.  The averaging model turns out to be superior to the adding 
model, because the latter is ruled out by averaging type errors.  But the averaging model also has 
some serious deficiencies. One of the most important is that it fails to account for 
interdependence among events. An item is assigned a likelihood value independent of the other 
items with which it is paired. This independence assumption is falsified by empirical violations 
of independence.  Also this model fails to account for the effect of event dependencies on the 
size and rate of conjunction errors, and it fails to explain the reduction in conjunction and 
disjunction errors when using mutually exclusive events. Finally, the averaging model cannot 
account for double conjunction errors and the conditional fallacy, but these findings are still open 
to question.  
 A probability judgment model based on memory retrieval has also been used to explain 
conjunction errors (Dougherty, Gettys, & Odgen, 1999). Two specific types of models were 
proposed, one for judgments based on stories (vignettes), and the other for judgments based on 
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training examples, but all of the studies in our review are based stories (vignettes), and so we 
limit our discussion to the first model. According to the vignette memory model, information 
about the story is stored in a memory trace (column) vector.  A single question is represented by 
a probe vector of the same length with values assigned to features related to both the question 
and the story, and zeros otherwise. A conjunctive question is represented by a single conjunctive 
probe, which is the direct sum of the two vectors, one vector representing each separate item.  
Retrieval strength (echo intensity) to a question is determined by the inner product between the 
memory trace vector and the question probe vector, and relative frequency judgments are 
proportional to echo intensity.  In Appendix C, we show that the vignette memory predicts the 
same order as an averaging model and thus it shares many of the same advantages and 
disadvantages of the averaging model.  Like the averaging model, the vignette memory model 
has no explicit mechanism for explaining event dependencies on conjunction errors. The latter 
problem arises from the fact that the conjunctive probe is simply the direct sum of the separate 
item probes.   
The quantum judgment model provides a common simple explanation for both 
conjunction and disjunction errors as well as unpacking effects and averaging errors. More 
importantly, it also makes a number of strong, testable, a priori predictions that are supported by 
the empirical results. This includes (a) the ordering of the most likely event compared to either 
disjunction or disjunction events (Equation 3), (b) the ordering of judgments for conjunction and 
disjunction events (Equation 4), (c) the effect of event dependency on the conjunction fallacy 
(Equation 5), (d) the effect of event likelihood on conjunction fallacy (Equation 6), (e) the order 
of a conditional versus a conjunction (Equation 8), (f) the effect of event order on the 
conjunction fallacy, (g) the occurrence of conjunction fallacies for three events (Equation 9), and 
(h) conjunction errors for unrelated events.  Overall, the predictions of the quantum judgment 
model agree with all of the well established empirical findings. The quantum model has some 
difficulty with double conjunction errors and the conditional fallacy, but the empirical status of 
these latter two findings remains weak. So far we have relied on evidence based on qualitative 
properties which provide tests of general principles. Next we turn to a more specific quantitative 
comparison of the averaging model and the quantum model.  
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III. Quantitative predictions for order effects on inference 
 Inference tasks provide an ideal paradigm for testing the quantum model. The hypotheses 
and different types of evidence can be controlled to manipulate the feature space, and the order 
that evidence is presented is easy to manipulate. Also, one of the oldest and most reliable 
findings regarding human inference is that the order in which evidence is presented affects the 
final inference (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).  Consider the following example from a medical 
inference task (Bergus, Chapman, Levy, Ely, & Oppliger, 1998). Physicians (N = 315) were 
initially informed about a particular women’s health complaint, and they were asked to estimate 
the likelihood that she had an infection on the basis of (a) the patient’s history and physical exam 
and (b) laboratory tests, presented in different orders.  For one order, the initial estimate started 
out at .67; after seeing the history/physical it increased to .78, and then after also seeing the lab 
test it decreased to .51. For the other order, the initial estimate again started at .67; after seeing 
the lab test it decreased to .44; and then after also seeing the history/physical it increased to .59. 
This is called a recency effect, because the same evidence had a larger effect when it appeared at 
the end as opposed to the beginning of a sequence. Recency effects are commonly observed in 
inference tasks whenever a sequence of judgments is made, one after each new piece of evidence 
(Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).  One might suspect that these order effects arise from memory recall 
failures, but it turns out that memory recall is uncorrelated with order effects in sequential 
judgment tasks (Hastie & Park, 1988).   
Order effects are problematic for a Bayesian model for the following reason. Suppose we 
have two abstract events {A, B} and a hypothesis H; then  
                
        
      
        
        
      
         , 
and the order used to evaluated these two events does not matter because the events commute 
AB =  BA. To account for order effects, a Bayesian model needs to introduce presentation 
order (e.g. event O1 that  A is presented before B, and event O2 that B is presented before A) as 
another piece of information, so that we obtain p(H|ABO1) > p(H|ABO2). But without 
specifying p(H)p(Oi|H)p(A|HOi)p(B|HOiA), this approach simply re-describes the 
empirical result, and such a specification is not known at present.  One difficulty that arises for 
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this approach is that presentation order is randomly determined, and order information is 
irrelevant. 
To explain order effects, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) proposed an anchor-adjust model 
in which order is not simply another piece of information, but rather evidence is accumulated one 
step at a time with a weight that depends on serial position. Recently, Trueblood and Busemeyer 
(2010b) developed a quantum inference model in which order is an intrinsic part of the process 
of sequentially evaluating information represented by incompatible perspectives.  However, the 
previous studies provided too few data points to provide a sufficiently strong test of the two 
competing models. Therefore Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010a) conducted a larger study of 
order effects to compare these two models. First we summarize this study and its basic findings. 
Then we describe the details of fitting both the anchor-adjust model and the quantum model to 
the results. Finally, we summarize the comparison of fits produced by the two competing 
models. 
Order Effects on Criminal Inference. The Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010a) study 
included total of 291 undergraduates from Indiana University.  Each one participated in a 
computer controlled experiment in which they read fictitious criminal cases (robbery, larceny, or 
burglary) and made judgments of guilt or innocence on a zero to one probability scale. A 
sequence of three judgments was made for each case: one before any presenting any evidence, 
and two more judgments after presentations of evidence by a prosecutor and a defense. For a 
random half of the cases, the prosecution was presented before the defense, and for the other half 
the defense was presented first. For example, in one case, participants read a short story (one 
short paragraph) about a burglarized warehouse, made an initial judgment based on no 
information, read a strong prosecution (described by three sentences), made a second judgment 
based only on this prosecution, read a weak defense (described by one sentence), and made a 
third judgment based on both the prosecution and the defense.  Altogether, each person was 
presented with eight cases based on the experimental design shown in Table 1. Each case was 
different for each person, and the assignment of cases to orders was counterbalanced across 
participants, which produce approximately 38 participants per order condition (See Trueblood & 
Busemeyer, 2010a for details). Note that different groups of participants are needed to produce 
different orders of evidence, and as far as we know, 12 order conditions is the largest existing 
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study of order effects on inference.   The main results are shown in Table 1, which shows the 
mean judgment, averaged over participants and across the eight cases.  
Table 1: Estimation of guilt following evidence (initial value equals .46) 
After First 
Evidence  
After Second 
Evidence 
Averaging version of      Anchor-
Adjust Model 
Quantum Inference Model 
WP = .651 WP,WD = .516 .578 .552 .647 .502 
 WP,SD = .398  .436  .407 
SP = .805 SP,WD = .687 .748 .587 .870 .689 
 SP,SD = .54  .4373  .527 
WD = .390 WD,WP = .619 .499 .589 .390 .639 
 WD,SP = .779  .747  .758 
SD = .278 SD,WP = .495 .401 .568 .275 .487 
 SD,SP = .69  .756  .702 
W = weak evidence, S = strong evidence, P = Prosecution, D = Defense 
Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2010b, provide more detailed results separately for each of 
the eight separate cases, but the results were consistent across cases, and so here we only present 
a summary. The initial judgment (prior to any information) produced a mean probability equal to 
.459 (this is not shown in the table). This small bias against guilt reflects the instruction to 
assume innocence at the beginning. The first column of Table 1 shows the effect of the first piece 
of information, which demonstrates a clear effect produced by manipulating the evidence. The 
second column shows the judgment after both pieces of evidence, which provide four tests for 
order effects. The strongest example is SP,SD = .54 < SD,SP =.69, which is a recency effect 
equal to .15; the other three recency effects were approximately equal to .10.  All four tests for 
order effects produced strong and statistically significant recency effects (all with p < .001, see 
Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2010b for details).  
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 Anchor - Adjust Inference Model.  Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) proposed a heuristic 
model of inference in which a new state of belief equals the previous (anchor) state plus an 
adjustment: 
 Cn = Cn1 + wn[s(En) Rn],       (10) 
where Cn is the new belief state after observing n pieces of information, Cn1 is the previous 
belief state after observing n1 pieces of information, s(En) is the evidence provided by the n
th
 
piece of information, wn is a weight and Rn is a reference point for this serial position. 
Furthermore, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) proposed the following principle for setting the serial 
position weight:  if [s(En)Rn] > 0 then wn = (1Cn1) and if [s(En)Rn] < 0 then wn = Cn1.   
Different versions of the model can be formed by imposing assumptions on the evidence, 
s(En), and the reference point, Rn.  One important variation is the averaging model, which is 
formed by assuming that 0  s(En)  1,  and setting Rn = Cn1.
9
 Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) 
prove that the averaging model is guaranteed to produce recency effects, which is found in all 
tests shown in Table 1. Another important version is the adding model, which is formed by 
assuming 1  s(En)  1 and setting Rn = 0.  As pointed out by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), the 
adding model is not guaranteed to produce recency effects.   
Recall that the averaging model provides a better explanation than the additive model for 
conjunction and disjunction errors. In fact, the adding model was ruled out by the averaging type 
errors discussed earlier. We think it is important for a model to be consistent across both 
probability judgment paradigms, the conjunction/disjunction and inference paradigms. Therefore 
we focus here on the averaging model. Of course this is only one version of the anchor and 
adjust model, and more complex versions can always be constructed by relaxing the assumptions 
about the serial position weight and the reference point.  But the averaging model is one of the 
primary models proposed by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) for recency effects, and it is also one 
of the primary models for explaining conjunction and disjunction fallacies. Trueblood and 
Busemeyer, 2010a,b present more model comparisons including averaging, adding models, and 
even more complex anchor-adjust models, but the conclusions we reach remain the same. 
                                                          
9
 In this case Cn = Cn1 + wn[s(En) Cn1]  = (1-wn)Cn1 + wns(En) and for n=2  
C2 = (1-wn-2)(1-wn-1)C0 + wn-2(1-wn)s(E1) + wns(En). 
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The averaging model cannot make any predictions for the first judgment (before 
presenting any evidence), and so this mean (.459) was used to initiate the averaging process, C0 
= .459, and then the model was fit to the remaining 12 conditions based on the second and third 
judgments. The averaging model requires estimating four parameters to fit the 12 conditions in 
Table 1. These four parameters represent the four values of s(E) corresponding to the four types 
of evidence WD, SD, WP, SP.  We fit the four parameters by minimizing the sum of squared 
errors (SSE) between the predicted and observed mean probability judgments for each of the 12 
conditions, which produced a SSE = .0704 (standard deviation of the error = .0766, R
2
 = .9833).  
The predicted values are shown under the two columns labeled Anchor-Adjust in Table 1.  The 
model correctly predicts the recency effects, but despite the high R
2
, the model fit is only fair. 
For example, the model severely overestimates the recency effect for the SDSP vs. SPSD 
comparison (predicted effect equals .319, observed effect equals .15). Also, the model fails to 
reproduce the correct ordering across all the conditions. For example, the averaging model 
predicts that SDSP = .756 > WDSP = .747 when in fact SDSP  = .69 < WDSP = .779. There are 
many other substantial quantitative prediction errors, which illustrate that even when the model 
is designed to produce recency effects, it still remains a challenge to fit these order effects. 
Quantum Inference Model. Before introducing the quantum model proposed by 
Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010a), let us first think about how a classic Bayesian model would 
be set up for this task. A simple classic probability model would be based on a sample space 
containing eight elementary events formed by combining 2 types of prosecutor evidence with 
two types of defense evidence and 2 hypotheses. A quantum model could be set up in the same 
manner by using a single basis formed by eight basis vectors, one corresponding to each of these 
eight elementary events. Then the events would all be compatible and the quantum model would 
make the same predictions as the classic Bayesian model. But this model would not produce any 
order effects. Instead, Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010b) proposed a quantum model that was 
designed to be as simple as possible for application to this criminal inference task.
10
 The basic 
idea is that the judge evaluates two types of evidence (positive vs. negative) regarding two 
hypotheses (guilty vs. innocent) from three points of view: a naïve point of view, the 
prosecutor’s point of view, and the defense point of view.  Using this basic idea, only a four 
                                                          
10
 Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010b) used this same quantum inference model to fit the results from the Bergus et al 
(1998) medical inference study and a criminal inference study by McKenzie, Lee, and Cheng (2002).   
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dimensional vector space is required. (In the following presentation, a superscript 
T
  is used to 
represent a transpose of a matrix, and a superscript 
†
 dagger is used represent a conjugate 
transpose of a matrix. In particular, [row vector]
T
  is a column vector.) 
The judgment process begins by describing this four dimensional space in terms of four 
basis vectors used to make a judgment from the naïve point of view: {|NG+ , |NG, |NI+ , |NI}, 
representing (guilty, positive), (guilty, negative), (innocent, positive), (innocent, negative), 
respectively.  The initial state equals  
| = nG+ |NG+ + nG  |NG + nI+  |NI+ + nI   |NI.  
For example, the third coordinate, nI+ represents the amplitude NI+|  initially assigned to the 
basis vector |NI+.  To be concrete, we represent |NG+ by the column vector [1,0,0,0]
T
, represent 
|NG by the column vector [0,1,0,0]
T
, represent |NI+ by the column vector [0,0,1,0]
T
, and 
represent |NI by the column vector [0,0,0,1]
T
. Thus the initial state vector | assigns a column 
vector of amplitudes n = [ nG+, nG, nI+, nI ]
T
 to the four basis vectors. We start with nG+ = nG = 
(1/2)(.459) and nI+ = nI = (1/2)(.541).  The positive or negative sign of the evidence has no 
meaning at this point because the judge has no idea what the evidence is about (we label it 
positive or negative for convenience, but at this stage, it only represents two possible types of 
evidence). Equating the amplitudes for the two types of unknown evidence is analogous to using 
a uniform prior in a Bayesian model when nothing is known.  The amplitude for guilt is lower 
because the instructions inform the person to assume innocent until proven guilty, and the .459 is 
chosen to reproduce the observed value of the first judgment (before any evidence is presented). 
This is also the same initial state used for averaging model.  The probability of guilt from this 
naïve perspective is obtained by first projecting this initial state onto the subspace for guilt. The 
projector for guilty equals PG = |NG+NG+| + |NGNG| which is represented by a 4 4 diagonal 
matrix with ones in the diagonals of the first two rows, and zeros elsewhere. The projection 
equals PG n = [(1/2)(.459), (1/2)(.459), 0, 0]
T
, and so the probability of guilt from the naïve 
judgment point of view equals ||PG n||
2
 = .459.  This initial state was chosen to reproduce the 
observed mean judgment of guilt equal to .459, slightly favoring not guilty, before any 
information is provided. 
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Next, suppose the prosecutor presents positive evidence favoring guilt followed by a 
likelihood judgment.  This requires an evaluation according to a different set of basis vectors, 
{|PG+, |PG, |PI+, |PI}, again representing (guilty, positive), (guilty, negative), (innocent, 
positive), (innocent, negative), but now representing the prosecutor’s viewpoint.  The initial state 
can be expressed in this basis as    
| = pG+  |PG+ + pG   |PG + pI+  |PI+ + pI   |PI. 
For example, the first coordinate, pG+ represents the amplitude PG+|  initially assigned to the 
basis vector |PG+.  Note that the amplitudes assigned according to the naïve perspective are 
different than those assigned according to the prosecutor’s perspective because the latter reflect 
the prosecutor’s arguments for guilt. The four prosecutor basis vectors can be represented by a 
44 unitary matrix denoted Unp, with the first column representing |PG+, the second column 
representing |PG, the third column representing |PI+ and the fourth column representing |PI.  
Later we will show exactly how we compute the unitary matrix, Unp, but at this point we will 
assume it is known, and continue with the evaluation of the prosecutor’s evidence.  First we 
consider how to revise the initial state based on the prosecutor’s positive evidence. The projector 
for the ‘positive evidence’ is denoted P+ and it is spanned by {|PG+ , |PI+}. According to 
principle 4, |+  = P+| /|| P+| ||, and 
P+| = |PG+PG+| + |PI+PI+| 
         = pG+ |PG+ + 0|PG  + pI+ |PI+  + 0|PI, 
and therefore 
       
   
                 
                 
   
                 
                .  
The revised state |+ is now represented in the prosecutor basis by the column vector of 
amplitudes p+ = [pG+, 0, pI+, 0]
T
 / (|pG+|
2
 + |pI+|
2
)
.5
.  
Next consider how to determine the probability of guilt after being presented with the 
prosecutor’s positive evidence. The projector for ‘guilty’ is denoted PG and it is spanned by 
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{|PG+ , |PG }.   According to principle 3, || PG|+||
2
 = || (PG+ + PG) |+ ||
2
, and because PG+  
and PG are orthogonal projections, it follows that  
 || PG+ |+ + PG|+ ||
2
 = || PG+|+ ||
2
 + || PG|+ ||
2
, 
and because the evidence is positive we have || PG|+ ||
2
 = 0 so that  
|| PG|+||
2
 = |PG+|+|
2
 = |pG+|
2
 / ( |pG+|
2
 + |pI+|
2
).     (11) 
Equation 11 provides a simple formula for computing the probability of guilt following the 
positive evidence by the prosecutor. All that is needed to use it is the column vector of 
amplitudes p = [pG+, pG, pI+, pI ]
T
 assigned to the four prosecutor basis vectors. These are 
related to amplitudes for the naïve basis by the unitary transformation,   
p = Unp
†n = Upnn , 
which is described later. At this point we will continue with the evaluation of the defense 
evidence. 
Finally, suppose the defense presents negative evidence after the positive evidence given 
by the prosecutor. Now the judge needs to view the two hypotheses and two types of evidence 
from the defense perspective. This entails a change of perspective to the defense basis, which 
requires an evaluation according to the four basis vectors |DG+ , |DG, |DI+ , |DI. The revised 
state can be re-expressed in terms of this basis as   
|+ = dG+  |DG+ + dG   |DG + dI+  |DI+ + dI   |DI. 
For example, the second coordinate, dG, represents the amplitude DG|+ assigned to the basis 
vector |DG at this point. Note that the amplitudes for the defense differ from the amplitudes for 
the prosecutor because the defense tries to persuade the judge to view the evidence from a 
different perspective, which weakens the prosecution and strengthens the defense. The four 
defense basis vectors can be represented by a 44 unitary matrix, denoted Und, with the first 
column representing |DG+, the second column representing |DG, the third column representing 
|DI+ and the fourth column representing |DI.  Later we will show exactly how we compute the 
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unitary matrix, Und, but at this point we will assume it is known, and continue with the evaluation 
of the defense evidence. Now consider how to revise the state based on the defense negative 
evidence. The projector for the ‘negative evidence’ is denoted P and it is spanned by {|DG , 
|DI}. According to principle 4, |+,  = P|+ /|| P|+ ||, and  
 P|+ = PG |+ + PI|+ = |DGDG|+ + |DIDI|+ 
         = 0|DG+ + dG|DG  + 0 |DI+  + dI  |DI. 
Finally, consider how to determine the probability of guilt after being presented with the 
prosecutor’s positive evidence and the defense’s negative evidence. The projector for ‘guilty’ is 
denoted PG and it is spanned by {|DG+ , |DG }.   According to principle 3, we obtain  
|| PG|+,||
2
 =  |dG|
2
 / ( |dG|
2
 + |dI|
2
).      (12) 
In sum, Equation 12 provides a simple formula for computing the probability of guilt following 
the positive evidence by the prosecutor and then negative evidence by the defense. All that is 
needed for this formula is the vector of amplitudes d+ = [dG+, dG, dI+, dI ] assigned to the four 
defense basis vectors. These amplitudes are related to amplitudes for the prosecutor basis by the 
unitary transformation,   
d+ = Und
†
Unp p+ =  UdnUnpp+ , 
which is described next.  
It is time to return to the question about how to specify the unitary matrices. A unitary 
matrix is one that satisfies UU† = I = U †U, and this is necessary for the quantum model in order 
to preserve lengths and inner products of the basis vectors (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000). The model 
uses three different bases: one for the naïve point of view, one for the prosecution point of view, 
and one for the defense point of view.  This in turn implies three unitary matrices that relate the 
amplitudes of the three bases: Upn that transforms amplitudes of the naïve basis into amplitudes 
of the prosecutor basis; Udn that transforms amplitudes of the naïve basis into amplitudes of the 
defense; and Udp which transforms amplitudes of the prosecutor into amplitudes of the defense. 
However, the last one is derived from the first two by the relation Udp = UdnUnp, with Unp = Upn
†
, 
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and furthermore Upd  = Udp
†
 and so we only need to describe how to construct Udn and Upn and all 
the rest are determined from just these two.
11
 Note that these unitary transformations are used 
independently of the particular belief state, and the same transformation from one set of 
coordinates to another is used for initial belief states as well as revised belief states.  In short, the 
transformations are only used to change the coordinate system used to represent the current 
belief state.  
Any unitary matrix can be constructed from a Hermitian matrix, H = H
†
, by the complex 
matrix exponential transformation U  = exp(ixH) (see Nielsen & Chuang, 2000 p. 84 ), where 
x is a parameter.
12
 Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010b) used a Hermitian matrix that was 
previously developed for two earlier psychological applications involving four dimensional 
vector spaces (see Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009, and Busemeyer, Wang, & Mogilianksy, 2009).  
In these previous applications, the Hermitian matrix H is constructed from two components, H = 
H1 + H2 , defined by 
    
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
 ,    
  
   
  
  
  
  
   
  
 .  (13) 
The purpose of H1 is to rotate amplitudes to favor either the presence of positive evidence or 
negative evidence; and the purpose of the second of H2 is to rotate beliefs toward guilt when 
positive evidence is present and to rotate beliefs toward innocence when negative evidence is 
present. Together these two matrices coordinate beliefs about evidence and hypotheses. The 
parameter x determines the degree of rotation and this is a free parameter in the model. We allow 
a different parameter value of x for Upn versus Udn. We also allow a different parameter value of 
x for strong and weak evidence. Altogether this produces four free parameter values for x, one 
for each combination of the four types of evidence WP, SP, WD, SD. This way of constructing 
the unitary matrices was chosen because it was the same as used in previous applications, and it 
is as simple as we can make it. Just as with the anchor-adjust model, more complex models are 
possible. (See Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2010b, for more details on this topic). 
                                                          
11
  The relation between Udp = UdnUnp follows from the fact that Und d =  n = Unpp and so d = UdnUnp p. 
12
 This matrix exponential is the solution to the Schrödinger equation. It is a function that is commonly available in 
matrix programming languages. 
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 To summarize, start with the naïve initial state n = .5[.459 .459 .541 .541]T, and 
compute the two unitary matrices Upn = exp(ixpH) and Udn = exp(ixdH) with H defined by 
Equation 13. First consider the prosecutor – defense order.  Transform p = Upnn, set p+ =  [pG+, 
0, pI+, 0]
T
 / (|pG+|
2
 + |pI+|
2
)
.5
, and then take the squared magnitude of  the first coordinate of p+ to 
obtain the probability of guilt following the first positive evidence. Next transform to d+ = 
UdnUnpp+, set d+, = [0, dG , 0, dI ]
T
/(|dG|
2
 + |dI|
2
)
.5
, and take the squared magnitude of the 
second coordinate of d+, to obtain the probability of guilt following the second negative 
evidence. Next consider the defense – prosecutor order. Transform d = Udnn, set d =  [0, dG, 0, 
dI]
T
 / (|dG|
2
 + |dI|
2
)
.5
, and then take the squared magnitude of the second coordinate of d to 
obtain the probability of guilt following the first negative evidence. Next transform to p = 
UpnUndd, set p,+ = [pG+, 0, pI+, 0]
T
 / (|pG+|
2
 + |pI+|
2
)
.5
, and take the squared magnitude of the first 
coordinate of p,+ to obtain the probability of guilt following the second positive evidence. 
Recency effects occur because the two operations of (1) unitary transformation used to change 
the point of view followed by (2) projection on type of evidence, do not commute. This causes 
the judgments after each piece of evidence to be order dependent, and the last point of view has 
the greatest impact.  
The quantum model requires fitting four parameters, a pair (xp,s , xd,s) for strong evidence 
and another pair (xp,w , xd,w) for weak evidence, to the 12 conditions in Table 2.  We fit the four 
parameters by minimizing the sum of squared errors (SSE) between the predicted and observed 
mean probability judgments for each of the 12 conditions plus the initial judgment, which 
produced a SSE = .0058 (standard deviation of the error = .022, R
2
 = .9986).  The predicted 
values are displayed in the last two columns of Table 1. This quantum model provides a very 
accurate fit, and it is a clearly better fit than the averaging model. Note that the quantum model 
correctly predicts all of the recency effects and it also correctly reproduces ordering of the 
probabilities across all conditions. The only place where the model makes a noticeable error is 
for the SP condition where it overestimates the strength of this evidence. 
Summary of the Quantitative Test. There were three purposes for this quantitative test of 
the quantum model. One was to extend the quantum model from the conjunction/disjunction 
paradigm to the inference paradigm. The second was to provide a detailed example showing how 
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to construct a vector space and unitary transformations relating different incompatible bases. The 
third was to provide a quantitative test that compares the quantum model with another heuristic 
model, the averaging model, for explaining order effects on inference. The averaging model was 
chosen for comparison because it was the strongest candidate for explaining conjunction-
disjunction errors, and it was also designed specifically to explain recency effects observed in 
inference tasks. 
Both the quantum model and the averaging model used the same initial belief, and both 
models were allowed to fit a separate parameter to the SP, WP, SD, and WD types of evidence. 
Thus both models had the same number of parameters (although the relative complexity of these 
models remains unknown). The models were fit to 12 different conditions in Table 1, which 
provides a challenging data set with strong recency effects. It is not so easy to fit these 12 
conditions, because the averaging model did not even succeed in reproducing the correct 
ordering across all the conditions. The quantum succeeded in producing a very accurate fit to all 
12 conditions.   
The quantitative test reported here is based on the average across eight individual 
criminal cases presented to the participants. Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010a,b) provide a more 
thorough analysis of each of the eight cases, and they show that the quantum model continues to 
fit better than the averaging model for all eight cases. Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010a,b) also 
compared the quantum model to the additive model (again with both using four parameters), and 
the quantum continues to fit better than the additive model. More importantly, Trueblood and 
Busemeyer (2010a,b) derived an important qualitative prediction from the quantum model that 
distinguishes the quantum model from the additive model. This property is based on the fact that 
the additive model is insensitive to the interdependence of evidence, whereas the quantum model 
is sensitive to this interdependence.  Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010a,b) report the results of a 
second experiment designed to test this property, and the predictions strongly supported the 
quantum model over the additive model. Finally, Trueblood and Busemeyer (2010b) compared 
the quantum model to a more complex version of the anchor – adjust model (one that allowed the 
reference R to be a free parameter, and used a logistic response function, which entailed more 
parameters than the quantum model). The two models were compared by using a challenging set 
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of order effects on inference reported by McKenzie, Lee, and Chen  (2002), and the quantum 
model continued to produce a better fit than the anchor – adjust model. 
We do not claim that we have proven the quantum model to be the correct explanation for 
recency effects on inference.  Nor have we proven the quantum model is always better than the 
anchor – adjust model. Much more research is needed to establish these facts. What we conclude 
is that this quantitative test makes a convincing case for considering the quantum model to be a 
viable new candidate for modeling human inference and it deserves to enter the model testing 
fray.  
IV. Other applications and extensions.  
 The quantum model presented here has been successfully applied to several other 
interesting areas, which demonstrates the generality of the theory. Below we briefly summarize 
three of these other applications.  We also point out third area that needs further theoretical and 
experimental research. 
Attitude questions. Question order effects are ubiquitous in survey research (Moore, 
2002), and quantum theory provides a natural explanation for these effects. In one example of a 
Gallup poll (N = 1002) reported in Moore (2002), half the participants were asked the pair of 
questions ‘is Clinton honest and trustworthy’ and then ‘is Gore honest and trustworthy‘, and half 
were asked the same pair of questions in the opposite order.  Clinton received 50% agreement 
when asked first and 57% when asked second; Gore received 68% when asked first and 60% 
when asked second. (This is called an assimilation effect, because the candidates become more 
similar after the first question). In another example Gallup poll (N = 1015) presented by Moore 
(2002), half the participants were asked `is Gingrich honest and trustworthy' and then `is Dole 
honest and trustworthy', and the other half were asked the same in the opposite order. Gingrich 
received 41% agreement when asked first and 33% when asked second; Dole received 60% 
agreement when asked first and 64% when asked second (which is called a contrast effect 
because the candidates become more different on the second question).  Two other kinds of order 
effects are also found called additive effects and subtractive effects (Moore, 2002).  In all of the 
studies reviewed by Moore (2002), order effects were found so that p(AyBn)   p(BnAy) and 
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p(AnBy)  p(ByAn) was observed, where for example p(AyBn) is the probability of yes to 
question A followed by no to question B. 
Wang and Busemeyer (2010) assumed that answers to back to back questions such as 
those reviewed in Moore (2002) are made using a sequence of projectors. For example, p(AyBy) 
= ||PBPA |||
2
 and p(ByAy) = ||PAPB |||
2
. If the projectors are non-commuting, then the 
sequence of projections produces order effects. This is the same assumption that we use to 
predict conjunction and disjunction errors. Wang and Busemeyer (2009) were able to derive all 
of the order effects reported in Moore (2002) from this simple model; but more importantly, they 
derived the following parameter free prediction from the model: If questions are answered back 
to back and no new information is presented in between questions then  
q = [p(AyBn) + p(AnBy)]  – [p(ByAn) + p(BnAy) ] = 0,  
Surprisingly, for the three data sets that satisfied the test requirement, the observed results 
produced an average q = .008 (average z test statistic = .44, N1000), which is a highly accurate 
prediction.
13
  These results provide strong evidence that the quantum model can make precise 
and accurate predictions regarding order effects on judgment. 
Decision making. The more specific quantum model described in section III also has 
been used in two of our earlier applications in decision making. Pothos and Busemeyer (2009) 
used this model to explain a phenomenon called the disjunction effect (Shafir & Tversky, 1992). 
This has been studied most frequently using the prisoner dilemma paradigm, which is a two 
player game and each player can choose to defect or cooperate. The phenomena refers to the 
surprising fact that the probability of defecting when the move of the opponent is unknown turns 
out to be less than the probability of defecting when either of the opponent’s move is known. The 
quantum model used a four dimensional vector space to represent the four combinations of 
beliefs about the opponent’s move (opponent defects or not), and actions by the player (player 
defect or not). This quantum model was compared to a Markov model which used the same four 
states, and while the quantum model provided a highly accurate description of the disjunction 
effect, the Markov model failed to do so. 
                                                          
13
 If new information is inserted in between questions, thus violating a key assumption used to derive the prediction, 
then we find strong and statistically significant deviations (see Wang and Busemeyer, 2009). 
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Busemeyer et al. (2009) used the same quantum model to explain a phenomenon called 
the interference of categorization on decision making. This phenomenon has been studied in a 
categorization –decision task in which participants are shown a face, and then they are asked to 
either (a) categorize the face as good or bad, or (b) make a decision to act friendly or defensive 
or (c) categorize the face and decide on an action. The interference effect refers to the surprising 
fact that the probability of attacking was higher when no categorization was made as compared 
to when the action was preceded by a categorization. Once again the quantum model used a four 
dimensional vector space to represent the combinations of categorizations (good, bad) and 
actions (friendly, defensive).  As before, the quantum model was compared to a Markov model 
which used the same four states, and while the quantum model provided an accurate description 
of the results, the Markov model failed to so. 
One limitation of the quantum probability model presented here is that it fails to describe 
the dynamic process that produces a judgment. Consequently we cannot predict the distribution 
of judgments or the time needed to make a judgment. However, some preliminary progress along 
this line has made (Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 2006; Fuss & Navarro, 2008). 
Quantum judgment process.  This article presents a theory of probability judgments, 
where the judged probabilities are based on the postulates described in section I. There are at 
least two important questions that we still need to address. How are these judgments made and 
how does one judgment affect a later judgment?   
The first question is what cognitive mechanism is used to produce a probability 
judgment? In physics, it is not possible to ask an electron to judge the probability that it’s in an 
excited as opposed to ground state. The physicist can only force the particle by a measurement 
interaction to resolve into a definite yes or no answer. Humans, however, are capable of making 
judgments. As in the case with many Bayesian judgment models, we remain agnostic about the 
exact mechanism used to generate these judgments. But if forced to speculate, then one idea is 
that beliefs in a quantum judgment model are assessed in the same way as familiarity in a 
memory recognition model. With regard to this idea, it is useful to compare the quantum model 
with a memory process model for probability judgments (MinervaDM, Dougherty et al., 1999). 
According to the memory model, probability judgments are determined by an ‘echo intensity,’ 
which equals the sum of the cubed inner products between vectors representing the memory for 
                    Quantum Probability 49 
 
the story and a vector representing the question. According to the quantum model, probability 
judgments are determined by a ‘squared projection,’ which equals the sum of the squared inner 
products between each basis vector entailed by a question and a belief state based on the story. In 
short, the ‘squared projection’ from quantum theory is analogous to the ‘echo intensity’ from 
MinveraDM. 
The second question is how does one judgment affect a later judgment? According to our 
postulate 4, the belief state is updated when the judge concludes that a new event has occurred or 
a new fact is true. This is the same principle that is used to update conditional probabilities in 
classic probability theory. The two probability theories only differ when incompatible events are 
involved in the judgment. Below we examine the two types of judgment problems reviewed in 
section II and III. 
Let us start with the juror inference task in which evidence is presented followed by a 
probability judgment of guilt. The presentation of new evidence causes the state to be revised by 
projecting the state onto the subspace consistent with the evidence. This is the same assumption 
that would be used in a Bayesian updating model or the averaging model. After this update, the 
person judges the probability of guilt. The belief state used to make this judgment contains the 
square roots of the judged probabilities for guilt and innocence. This judgment does not require 
the juror to resolve his or her uncertainty about guilt (i.e., the juror does not have to conclude 
whether the defendant is definitely guilty or not). Therefore the judgment about guilt leaves the 
juror in the same indefinite and uncertain state regarding guilt as before judgment. If instead we 
ask the juror to resolve all uncertainty and make a firm decision (definitely decide guilty versus 
not guilty), then the conclusion that the juror finally reaches about guilt could change the juror’s 
state of belief from an indefinite to a definite state (and affect later punishment judgments).   
Finally, consider the probability judgment for the conjunction task. If the person is asked 
to judge the probability that Linda is a feminist bank teller, then first the person judges the 
probability that feminism is true of Linda; second, the person projects the state onto the subspace 
for the feminism event in order to judge the conditional probability of bank teller given that 
feminism is true. The person only judges the probability of bank teller at this point, and is not 
required to reach any firm conclusions. Therefore the state remains indefinite about the bank 
teller question after the probability judgment about bank teller, and the final state immediately 
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after this sequence equals the projection on the feminism event.  Now suppose another question 
about Linda is asked afterwards. One hypothesis is that the person remains passively in the state 
left over from the previous judgment (the normalized projection of Linda on feminism).  
However, people are not passive entities like particles in physics, and instead they are capable of 
actively changing their own state (by reading information or retrieving new thoughts). A more 
plausible hypothesis is that the person refers back to the Linda story before another judgment is 
made, and thereby resets the state to one based on the original Linda story.
14
  
Contribution of quantum ideas to psychology and rationality 
 Quantum probability theory introduces a new concept to the field of psychology – that is 
the concept of compatibility between events.  More accurately, we should say `re-introduce' this 
distinction, because Niels Bohr (one of the founding fathers of quantum theory) actually 
borrowed the idea of complementarity (Bohr’s term for incompatibility) from William James 
(one of the founding fathers of psychology). Quantum theory also raises some questions about 
the rationality of human judgments.  Is this probability system rational, and if not, then why 
would people use this system? These two issues are addressed below. 
 Compatibility.  The key new principle that distinguishes classic and quantum 
probabilities is the concept of compatibility.  According to classic probability, all events are 
subsets of a common sample space, S, that is, all events are based on a common set of 
elementary events. Questions about different events, A, and B, must refer to this same common 
space S, which makes the two questions compatible. In the present application, each of the 
elementary events represents a combination of feature values, and so a classic representation 
requires one to assign probabilities to all of the combinations for all of the features. If there are a 
lot of features, then this involves a large number of elementary events, resulting in a very 
complex probability function. To simplify this probability function, Bayesian theorists often 
impose strong conditional independence assumptions, which may or may not be empirically 
valid. 
                                                          
14
 One can go on asking how this is done using quantum computing and information principles, and one answer is to 
use if-then types of control U gates (see Nielsen and Chuang, 2000), but this is getting too far into the realm of 
speculation with respect to the data at hand. 
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Quantum theory allows a person to use an incompatible representation. In other words, a 
person is not required to use a single (but very large) common set of features and their 
combinations. Instead, one set of features and their combinations could be used to answer a 
question A, and another set of features and their combinations could be used to answer another 
question, B. The features can be selected to answer a specific question. The person does not have 
to assign probabilities to all the combinations from both questions A and B. Moreover, forming 
all combinations for answering all possible questions could easily exceed a person’s knowledge 
capabilities. This is especially true if one considers all the various sorts of questions that a person 
might be asked. It is a lot more practical and efficient for a person to use an incompatible 
representation, because one only needs to assign probability amplitudes to the set of feature 
patterns needed to answer a specific question. Quantum theory achieves this efficiency by using 
different basis vectors to represent different questions within the same vector space. Quantum 
theory retains coherence among these different incompatible questions by relating them through 
a (unitary) rotation of the basis vectors. In other words, one question might require viewing the 
problem from a first perspective, but then a second question might require viewing the problem 
from a different perspective. The two perspectives are complementary in the sense that they are 
systematically related by a rotational transformation.  
An important question for any quantum model of cognition is the following: when will 
two questions rely on a compatible versus an incompatible representation?  We argue that a 
compatible representation may be formed under two circumstances. The first is when the judge 
has received a sufficiently extensive amount of experience with the combinations of feature 
values to form a belief state over all of these combinations. If an unusual or novel combination of 
events is presented, and the person has little or no experience with such combinations, then they 
may not have formed a compatible representation, and they must rely on incompatible 
representations of events that use the same small vector space but require taking different 
perspectives. In fact, conjunction errors disappear when individuals are given direct training 
experience with pairs of events (Nilsson, 2008), and order effects on abductive inference also 
decrease with training experience (H. Wang, Todd, & Zhang, 2006). A second way to facilitate 
the formation of a compatible representation is to present the required joint frequency 
information in a tabular format (Wolfe, 1995; Wolfe & Reyna, 2009; Yamagishi, 2003). 
Instructions to use a joint frequency table format would encourage a person to form and make 
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use of a compatible representation that assigns amplitudes to the cells of the joint frequency 
tables. 
 Quantum rationality.   Both classic (Kolmogorov) and quantum (von Neumann) 
probability theories are based on a coherent set of principles. In fact, classic probability theory is 
a special case of quantum probability theory in which all the events are compatible.  So why do 
we need to use incompatible events, and isn't this irrational? In fact, the physical world obeys 
quantum principles and incompatible events are an essential part of nature. Nevertheless, there 
are clear circumstances where everyone agrees that the events should be treated classically (such 
as random selection of balls from urns or dice throwing). Perhaps in these circumstances a 
person uses a quantum representation because he or she is willing to trade some accuracy for a 
simpler (lower dimensional) representation of uncertainty. Furthermore, it remains an empirical 
question whether quantum or Bayesian methods are more useful for modeling probabilities of 
very complex sequences when the joint probabilities are largely unknown.
15
 Also, incompatible 
events may be essential for understanding our commonly occurring but nevertheless very 
complex human interactions. For instance, when trying to judge something as uncertain as 
winning an argument with another person, the likelihood of success may depend on using 
incompatible representations that allows viewing the same facts from different perspectives.  As 
another example, judges or jurors in a courtroom setting must adopt both prosecution and 
defense perspectives for viewing the same facts (Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2010b).  
Human judges may be capable of using either compatible or incompatible 
representations, and they are not constrained or forced to use just one. The use of compatible 
representations produces judgments that agree with the classic laws of probability, whereas the 
use of incompatible representations produces violations. But the latter may be necessary to deal 
with deeply uncertain situations (involving unknown joint probabilities), where one needs to rely 
on simple incompatible representations to construct sequential probabilities coherently from 
quantum principles. In fact, both types of representations, compatible and incompatible, may be 
available to the judge, and the context of a problem may trigger the use of one or the other 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). More advanced versions of quantum probability theory (using a Fock 
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 In this case, a Bayesian model must approximate by using conditional independence assumptions that could be 
false. 
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space, which is analogous to a hierarchical Bayesian type model) provide principles for 
combining both types of representations (Aerts, 2009). 
 Concluding Comments.  During the 19
th
 century, it was hard for scientists to imagine that 
there could be any geometry other than Euclidean geometry; but non Euclidean geometries 
eventually became essential for many important scientific applications. During the 20
th
 century, 
it was equally hard for scientists to imagine that there could be any probability theory other than 
classic probability; but quantum probability became essential to physics. It’s importance for 
psychology is beginning to be recognized as well (Shiffrin, 2010).  
Quantum theory is one of the most elegant and internally consistent creations of the 
human mind. It was developed by several ingenious physicists as a way to assign probabilities to 
physical events.  This article explores its potential for assigning probabilities to psychological 
events, specifically in the context of human judgment. In fact, we have utilized the basic axioms 
of quantum probability theory and simply augmented them with an additional postulate, 
regarding the order in which multiple questions are evaluated. On the basis of uncontentious 
assumptions regarding the relatedness of different pieces of information and the similarity 
between different instances, we showed how it is possible to account for many of the basic 
findings in human probabilistic judgment. The main aspect of quantum theory which makes it 
successful relates to order effects in probability computations. Order effects arise in quantum 
theory because it is a geometric theory of probabilities: probabilities are computed from 
projections to different subspaces. But, as we have shown, it is typically the case that the order 
with which these projections occur can affect the eventual outcome. Empirical findings on 
human judgment indicate strong order effects as well and it is for this reason that quantum theory 
appears to provide an intuitive and parsimonious explanation for such findings. We conclude that 
quantum information processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to 
understand human judgment and reasoning.
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Appendix A 
The first part of this appendix provides a simple geometric and numerical example of an 
order effect based on the vectors shown in Figure 1 below (visual display limits this to three 
dimensions).  Our example expresses all the vectors in terms of coordinates with respect to the 
standard X, Y, Z basis in Figure 1. In this figure, one basis is generated by the X = [1, 0, 0], Y = 
[0, 1, 0], and Z = [0, 0, 1] basis vectors. The blue X,Y,Z basis could represent three mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive answers to an XorYorZ question. A second basis is generated by the U 
= [1/2, 1/2, 0], V = [1/2, 1/2, 1/2], and W = [1/2, 1/2, 1/2] basis vectors. The orange 
U,V,W basis could represent three mutually exclusive and exhaustive answers to another 
incompatible UorVorW question. The initial state is represented by the black vector S = [.6963, 
.6963, .1741] in the figure.  
Figure 1 
f 
To become familiar with the quantum method of calculating probabilities, let us first 
compute the probabilities for saying yes to question X (squared length of the projection of S onto 
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the ray spanned by X), as well as the probability of saying yes to question W (squared length of 
the projection of S on the ray spanned by W).  In general, the projection of a state onto a ray is 
determined by the inner product of the state and the basis vector that spans the ray.  The inner 
product between a vector T with coordinates [t1,…,tN] and another vector S with coordinates 
[s1,…,sN] is defined (using Dirac bracket notation) as T|S =  (ti*  si). (Here ti* is the conjugate 
of ti, but in this example, all of the coordinates are real and so ti* = ti). First, consider the 
probability of choosing X when asked question XorYorZ from state S. The event ‘yes’ to X is 
represented by a ray spanned by the basis vector X. The inner product between X and S, equals 
X|S =(1)(.69631) + (0) (.69630) + 0(.17410) = .6963, the projection of S onto X equals the 
point labeled A = (.6963)X in the figure, and the probability of choosing this answer equals 
||.6963X||2 =|.6963|2||X||2 = (.6963)21 = .4848. Note that it is arbitrary whether we use the 
basis vector X or X* = (X) to span the ray representing question X, because they both span the 
same ray. In the latter case, the inner product equals X*|S = +.6963, yet the projection is exactly 
the same A = (+.6963)X* = (.6963)X. In other words, the question is represented by a ray, and 
the ray spanned by the basis vector X does not have a positive or negative direction.  Next 
consider the probability of choosing W when asked question UorVorW from state S. The 
projection of S on the basis vector W is determined by the inner product W|S = (1/2)(.6963) 
+ (1/2)(.6963) + (1/2)(1741) = .8194, the projection equals the point labeled B = (.8194)W, 
and the probability of choosing this answer equals ||.8194W||2 =|.8194|2||W||2 = (.8194)21 = 
.6714.  
To examine the order effect, compare (a) asking U first and then X with (b) asking X first 
and then U.  (Consider U the bank teller event, and consider X the feminist event.) Note that in 
the figure, the probability of X given U equals |X|U|2 = .50 = |U|X|2 which also equals the 
probability of U given X. In this example the inner product between the initial state S and the 
basis vector U  is zero, S|U = 0, so these two vectors are orthogonal. (We made these two 
vectors orthogonal so that it is easy to visualize the relation in the figure. We could easily adjust 
all the vectors slightly so that the probabilities are small but non zero and make the same point 
below.)  The fact that S and U are orthogonal implies that the probability of saying yes to 
question U directly from the initial state S is zero. But, if we first ask whether X is true, then 
there is a probability (.4848) of answering yes; and if the answer is yes to X, then the projection 
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of X on U equals (1/2)U, and so now there is a probability (1/2)2 = .50 of saying yes to U 
given yes to X. Thus the probability from the direct path S  U equals zero, but the probability 
of the indirect path S  X  U equals .4848  .50 =.2424. Therefore, this is an example in 
which the joint probability of first saying yes to X and then yes to U exceeds the single 
probability of saying yes to U when it is asked first.  
The second part of this appendix explains why we can always choose a basis using basis 
vectors that produce amplitudes which are square roots of probabilities. The reason being that at 
the time of judgment, the phase of an amplitude is not meaningful, because it is not unique, and 
so it can be ignored, and we only need to consider the magnitude.  
Consider a basis {|E1,…,|EN} for describing a state | in an N dimensional space. The 
state vector | can be represented in the |Ej basis by expressing it as a linear combination  
| =   |EjEj|.  
The amplitude Ej| assigned to the basis vector |Ej equals the inner product between the state 
vector and the basis vector. In general, this inner product can be a complex number expressed as 
Ej| = Rje
ij
, with 0  Rj  1, and Rj
2
 equals the probability for the ray spanned by the basis 
vector |Ej. Note that e
ijeij = 1 so that 
  | =   |EjEj| =  |Ej(e
ijeij)Ej|   
=  eij  |Ej  (e
ij Ej|) =  |FjFj|. 
What we have done here is change from the |Ej basis to the |Fj basis for describing the state 
vector |. But |Fj = e
ij
  |Ej spans the same ray as |Ej, and the squared magnitude of the 
amplitude |Fj||
2
 = |e
ijEj||
2
 = Rj
2
 produces the same probabilities as |Ej||
2
 = Rj
2
. Suppose 
a question about an event corresponds to a subspace spanned by {|Ej, j X, where X is the set of 
basis vectors that define the event in question}. This subspace corresponds to the projector PX = 
 |EjEj| for j X.  Then the matrix representation of PX with respect to the |Ej basis is the NN 
matrix PX  with Ej|PX|Ej = 1 in rows j  X and Ei|PX|Ej = 0 otherwise; the matrix 
representation of  PX with respect to the |Fj basis is exactly the same matrix PX  with the value 
Fj|PX|Fj =  e
ijEj|PX|Eje
ij
 =Ej|PX|Ej = 1 in row i  X and zero otherwise.  Finally, the 
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probability of the event in question equals ||PX|||
2
 =  ||PX E||
2
 = ||PX  F||
2
   Therefore we can 
represent the state using either basis. To make the state more meaningful for cognition, we can 
choose to orientate the basis vectors so that they represent the state vector by using the square 
roots of probabilities. Then why do we need the phases?  
The phases of the amplitudes are critical when a unitary transformation is used to change 
from one basis to another basis. Suppose A is an N1 unit length column vector with complex 
coordinates [a1,…,aN] = [|a1|e
i1,…,|aN|e
iN
]; for this vector, we can define a unitary matrix UA  
= diag[e
i1
,…,e iN] so that (UA A) is now a positive real unit length vector containing 
coordinates [|a1|,…,|aN|] in this new basis. Suppose B is another N1 unit length column vector 
with coordinates [b1,…,bN] = [|b1|e
i1, …, |bN|e
iN
]; again for this vector we can define a unitary 
matrix UB  = diag[e
i1,…,eiN] so that (UB B) is also a positive real unit length vector with 
coordinates [|b1|,…, |bN|]. Finally, suppose the original complex vectors A and B are related by an 
NN complex valued unitary transformation matrix UBA so that B = UBAA.  Then we have the 
following relations 
  B =UBA A   (UBB) = (UB UBA  UA
1
)(UAA). 
The positive real vector (UAA) produces the same probabilities for events as the complex vector 
A, and the positive real vector (UBB) produces the same probabilities for events as the complex 
vector B, and the matrix (UB UBA  UA
1
) is the unitary matrix that transforms (UAA) into (UBB).  
So we get the same exact answers using {A , B , UBA} or {(UAA),(UBB),(UBUBAUB
1
)}, and the 
latter only uses the square roots of probabilities. However, the phases remain important for the 
unitary transformation because |bj| = |  uijaj |  |  |uij|| aj | ,and this is exactly where the 
interference enters the theory.  
The unitary transformation can be interpreted as a fully interconnected hidden unit neural 
network:  input (UAA)  associative network (UB UBA  UA
1
)  (UBB) output.   Instead of 
using logistic hidden units as in a standard connectionist model, the unitary transformation uses 
sine-cosine units. We only require that the output amplitude (UBB) be explicitly available for 
awareness or reporting, and the phase captures implicit memory interference effects produced by 
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the wave mechanical oscillations of the underlying neural based retrieval system represented by 
the unitary operator (Acacio de Barros & Suppes, 2009).   
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Appendix B 
The purpose of this appendix is to prove the following two propositions: 
1.  The conjunction and disjunction fallacies occur only if the events are incompatible. 
2.  The simultaneously explanation of both the conjunction and disjunction fallacies requires the 
following order constraint:  ||PF PB|||
2
 < ||PB PF|||
2
.   
But before we begin, recall that | is a vector within a finite dimensional vector space defined 
on a field of complex numbers (technically, a finite dimensional Hilbert space).  PA denotes a 
projector on the subspace A which is a Hermitian matrix that satisfies PA PA = PA.  
Proposition 1:  The conjunction and disjunction fallacies occur only if the events are 
incompatible. 
Proof: 
If the events are compatible, then the projectors commute, PB PF  = PF PB, and the interference 
term equals  
B,~F|B,F =|PBP~FPB PF| =|PBP~FPF PB| = 0 because P~FPF = 0.  
If the interference term is zero then the probability of the single event, shown on the left hand 
side of Equation 1, is simply the sum of the two conjunction probabilities, and so the left hand 
side must be greater than or equal to each individual conjunction probability on the right hand 
side. QED. 
We need prove two lemmas before proving the second proposition.  
Lemma 1:  The interference term for event ~F is the negative of the interference term for event F. 
Proof: 
1 = ||PF|||
2
 +||P~F|||
2
 
=  [ ||PFPB|||
2
 + ||PFP~B|||
2
 + F ] +[ ||P~FPB|||
2
 + ||P~FP~B|||
2
 + ~F ] 
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=   [ ||PFPB|||
2
 +||P~FPB|||
2
 ] +  [ ||PFP~B|||
2
 + ||P~FP~B|||
2
 ] + [ F + ~F ] 
=    [||PB|||
2||PF|B||
2
 +||PB|||
2||P~F|B||
2
 ]   
   + [ ||P~B|||
2
 ||PF|~B||
2
 + ||P~B|||
2
 ||P~F|~B||
2
 ]  
   + [ F + ~F] 
=    ||PB|||
2
 [||PF|B||
2
 +||P~F|B||
2
 ]  
   + ||P~B|||
2
 [||PF|~B||
2
 +||P~F|~B||
2
 ]  
   +  [ F + ~F] 
 = ||PB|||
2
 1 + ||P~B|||
2
 1 + [ F + ~F] 
 =    1 + [ F + ~F]   [ F + ~F]  = 0.  QED. 
Lemma 2: The following two expressions for the interference terms are equivalent:  
B = B,~F|B,F + B,F|B,~F = 2{ Re[|PB PF|]  ||PBPF|||
2
 } 
F = F,~B|F,B + F,B|F,~B = 2{ Re[|PF PB|]  ||PFPB|||
2
 } 
Proof:    
Note that B,F|B,~F = B,~F|B,F* (where * indicates the conjugate) so that  
B = B,~F|B,F + B,F|B,~F = 2Re[B,~F|B,F]  
F = F,~B|F,B + F,B|F,~B = 2Re[F,~B|F,B], 
 where Re(x) is the real part of the complex number x.  It then follows that  
B = 2Re[B,~F|B,F] = 2Re[|P~F PBPB PF|] = 2Re[|P~F PB PF|] 
=2Re[|(I  PF)PB PF|] =2{ Re[|PB PF|]  ||PBPF|||
2
 }. 
A similar argument applies to produce the alternative expression for F. QED. 
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Proposition 2:  The simultaneously explanation of both the conjunction and disjunction fallacies 
requires the following order constraint:  ||PF PB|||
2
 < ||PB PF|||
2
.   
Proof: 
Recall from Equation 1 the interference term from bank teller event equals B = B,~F|B,F + 
B,F|B,~F, and the conjunction error requires B  < ||PBP~F|||
2
. Recall from Equation 2 that 
the interference term from the not feminist event equals ~F = ~F,B|~F,~B + ~F,~B|~F,B, and 
the disjunction error requires ~F < ||P~FPB|||
2
.  Also note from Lemma 1 that ~F = F. From 
this last expression it follows that F < ||P~FPB|||
2
 which then implies that F > ||P~FPB|||
2
.  
Using the new expression for the interference based on Lemma 2, we see that the two 
inequalities require that 
 F = 2{ Re[|PF PB|]  ||PFPB|||
2
 } > ||P~FPB|||
2
  
                    >    ||PBP~F|||
2
 > 2{ Re[|PB PF|]  ||PBPF|||
2
 } = B.  
But Re[|PF PB|] = Re[|PB PF|], which implies that  ||PFPB|||
2
  >  ||PBPF|||
2
 and 
therefore we require ||PFPB|||
2
  <  ||PBPF|||
2
.   QED. 
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Appendix C 
According to the vignette version of the memory model, information about the story is 
stored in a memory trace (column) vector denoted T. A single question A is represented by a 
probe (column) vector of the same length, PA, with values assigned to features related to both the 
question and the story, and zeros otherwise. Retrieval strength (echo intensity) to a question is 
determined by the inner product between the memory trace vector and the question probe vector, 
IA = [PA|T/NA]³. Note that the inner product is normalized by dividing it by a number, NA, that 
depends on the number of nonzero elements in the question probe vector.  Frequency or relative 
frequency judgments are assumed to be proportional to echo intensity (which requires the 
intensity to be non-negative). A conjunctive question ‘L and U’ is represented by a single 
conjunctive probe, which is the direct sum (concatenation) of two minivectors (this is the same 
as summing two non-overlapping vectors). If PL is a row minivector for L with length NL, and PU 
is a row minivector for U with length NU, and 0N is a row vector of N zeros, then PL&U =  
[PL|PU]=[PL|0NL]+[0NU|PU] = PL + PU.  The echo intensity of this conjunction probe produces 
something akin to an average, 
 (IL&U)
1/3
 = PL&U|T)/NL&U =  PL +PU |T/NL&U  
  = PL|T/NL&U + PU|T)/NL&U 
  = (NL/(NL+NU)⋅(IL)
1/3
 +(NU/(NL + NU)⋅ (IU)
1/3
 
which is a weighted average 
 = wL⋅(IL)
1/3
 + wU⋅(IU)
1/3
,   
with weights wL = NL/(NL+NU) and wU = NU/(NL+NU).  The intensity is the cube [(IL&U)
1/3
]
3
 = Il&U 
and the cubic function is monotonically increasing, so the intensity is ordered the same as 
(IL&U)
1/3
. 
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